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The (Il-)legitimacy of the EU Post-Crisis Bailout System 
Michael Anderson Schillig 
 
Despite the strong political rhetoric against taxpayer-funded bailouts, in reality the 
government will always intervene when the distributional effects of a pre-determined 
loss allocation regime are deemed to be unacceptable. A number of commentators 
have argued for the development of a structured bailout framework that ensures the 
political legitimacy and efficiency of bailouts whilst minimizing their potentially 
harmful effects. The Treasury Report to the President on Orderly Liquidation 
Authority and Bankruptcy Reform embraces a similar approach. Unlike OLA, the EU 
post-crisis bailout system has already been tested. This system consists of three 
elements: the BRRD/SRM resolution framework reflecting the post-crisis reform 
effort; national corporate insolvency law as the default option; and the overarching 
and non-sectorial EU State aid regime. Combining system analysis and the concept of 
regulatory legitimacy, this article examines the complex trifurcated EU post-crisis 
bailout system. Its central claim is that the current system calibration invites bailout 
decisions that are lacking in legitimacy because the system is unlikely to produce 
outputs that match the system’s goal of limiting bailouts to those that are likely to be 
‘pie-increasing’ and desirable. These shortcomings should be addressed primarily 
through re-calibrating interconnections in a way that would elevate the BRRD/SRM 
resolution framework’s status and transform it into the EU’s Bank Resolution and 
Insolvency Code; with national corporate insolvency law and the EU State aid regime 
resigned to supporting roles within the resolution framework. The modification of 
system elements, notably through the appropriate setting of MREL, could further 
enhance overall output legitimacy.    
 
 
I. Introduction – The Trifurcated EU Bailout System ...................................................... 2 
II. Terminology: Bailout versus State aid ............................................................................ 8 
III. Regulatory Legitimacy and Law-Related System Analysis ...................................13 
1) Input Legitimacy I: System Setup ........................................................................................... 16 
2) Input Legitimacy II: System Design ........................................................................................ 21 
3) Output Legitimacy I: System Elements ................................................................................. 26 
4) Output Legitimacy II: System Output .................................................................................... 37 
a) The Social Benefits of Bailouts .............................................................................................................. 39 
b) The Social Costs of Bailouts .................................................................................................................... 40 
c) Cost-Benefit Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 44 
IV. Cost Reduction Mechanisms ............................................................................................45 
1) Corporate Insolvency Law ......................................................................................................... 46 
2) BRRD/SRM Resolution Framework ....................................................................................... 51 
3) EU State Aid Regime ..................................................................................................................... 61 
4) Implications ..................................................................................................................................... 63 
V. Calibrating Costs and Benefits: Intra-System Interactions ....................................65 
1) The BRRD/SRM Resolution Trigger ....................................................................................... 66 
2) EU State Aid Only: ‘Precautionary Recapitalization’ ....................................................... 68 
3) Default Regime: Corporate Insolvency Law ....................................................................... 71 
4) Implications ..................................................................................................................................... 74 





I. Introduction – The Trifurcated EU Bailout System  
 
 
At the height of the Global Financial Crisis, an unprecedented amount of resources 
were mobilized in order to stabilize financial institutions and markets.1 Politically, 
these bank bailouts were extremely unpopular and lawmakers reacted by introducing 
regulatory frameworks with a view to making future bank bailouts less likely. At the 
international level, efforts have been coordinated through the G20 and the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), culminating in the FSB’s Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes.2 One of the clearest expressions of the underlying anti-bailout 
philosophy can be found in the Preamble to the Dodd-Frank Act, which presents itself 
as an ‘Act … to end “too big to fail”’ and ‘to protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts.’3 When he signed Dodd-Frank into law, President Obama remarked: ‘There 
will be no more tax-funded bailouts.’4 And more recently, President Trump’s ‘Core 
Principles’ to guide reform of the US financial regulatory system include the 
prevention of taxpayer-funded bailouts and moral hazard. 5 Despite this strong 
political rhetoric, it is generally accepted that future bailouts are inevitable. The 
government can and will intervene where the distributional effects of a pre-
determined loss allocation regime are deemed to be politically and/or socio-
economically unacceptable.6 A number of US commentators have therefore argued 
for the development of a structured bailout framework that ensures the political 
legitimacy and efficiency of bailouts whilst minimizing their potentially harmful 
effects.7 The Treasury Report to the President on Orderly Liquidation Authority and 
                                                        
1 See infra Part IV. 
2 Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions 
(2011; and 2014), http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policy-development/effective-resolution-regimes-
and-policies/key-attributes-of-effective-resolution-regimes-for-financial-institutions/. 
3 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Publ. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010), Preamble. 
4 Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010, Daily 
Comp. Pres. Doc. 617 (July 21, 2010).  
5 Presidential Executive Order on Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial System, 
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-core-
principles-regulating-united-states-financial-system/. 
6 Christos Hadjiemmanuil, Bank Stakeholders’ Mandatory Contribution to Resolution Financing: 
Principle and Ambiguities of Bail-In in: ECB LEGAL CONFERENCE 2015: FROM MONETARY UNION TO 
BANKING UNION, ON THE WAY TO CAPITAL MARKETS UNION, NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION (2015), 225, 245: ‘Bailouts may become more rare than in the past, but there will still be 
concrete situations when they will appear to constitute the best available solution.’ 
7 Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011); Jeffrey Manns, Building Better 
Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349 (2011); Eric A. 
Posner & Anthony Casey, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479 (2015); 
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Bankruptcy Reform8 follows a similar trajectory. It advocates for the introduction of a 
new Chapter to the Bankruptcy Code – ‘Chapter 14’ –, which would be geared 
specifically to the resolution of financial companies. In accordance with research 
proposals from the Hoover Institution9 and a number of legislative proposals,10 this 
reformed bankruptcy process would be the resolution method of first resort without ‘a 
single dollar of taxpayer support’ required.11 Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Resolution 
Authority (OLA) should be retained as ‘an emergency tool for use under 
extraordinary circumstances’12 und subject to significant limitations and reform. 
Notably, the protections against taxpayer loss exposure from uncovered Orderly 
Resolution Fund (OLF) loans should be enhanced so a to reduce any remaining risk to 
the greatest possible extent and to incentivize institutions to swiftly return to private 
funding. Whether any of these measures will eventually be implemented remains to 
be seen. However, they certainly highlight the need for a discussion about a bailout 
framework that goes beyond a mere ad hoc injection of funds into ailing firms and 
markets, and which is at the same time flexible enough to withstand a major systemic 
crisis.             
 
Unlike OLA in the United States, the EU post-crisis bailout system has already been 
tested. The EU’s non-sectorial structured bailout framework predates the Global 
Financial Crisis by many decades.13 Under the EU State aid regime, ‘aid’ is forbidden 
to the extent that it restricts competition and has an effect on trade between Member 
                                                                                                                                                              
Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Governmental Intervention in an Economic Crisis, 19 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 7 (2016). For an early systematic analysis of bailouts see Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert 
Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951 (1992); and later Cheryl D. Block, 
Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149 (2010). 
8 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM 
ISSUED APRIL 21, 2017: ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY AND BANKRUPTCY REFORM (Feb. 21, 
2018).  
9 KENNETH E. SCOTT, THOMAS H. JACKSON & JOHN B. TAYLOR (eds), MAKING FAILURE FEASIBLE: 
HOW BANKRUPTCY REFORM CAN END “TOO BIG TO FAIL” (2015).  
10 Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act, S.1861, 113th Congress (1st Session 2013) 
(died in previous a Congress); Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act 2014, HR 5421, 113 th Congress (2d 
Session 2014) (died in a previous Congress); Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act 2017, H.R. 1667, 
115th Congress (2017) (passed in the House); Financial CHOICE Act 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Congress 
(2017) (passed in the House).     
11 REPORT, supra note 8, at 7.  
12 Id.at 6. An outright repeal of OLA seems to be no longer on the agenda, Jens-Hinrich Binder, 
Michael Krimminger, Matia J. Nieto and Dalvinder Singh, The choice between judicial and 
administrative sanctioned procedures to manage liquidation of banks: A transatlantic perspective, 
(September 2018) 8 (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244334).  
13 Alberto Heimler & Frédéric Jenny, The limitations of European Union control of state aid, 28 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL. 347, 351-352 (2012). 
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States. The Commission may, however, authorize certain types of aid if they fall 
within specified exemptions provided for under the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). Member States must notify the Commission of any 
envisaged aid measures, and, following notification, the Commission must assess the 
respective measures in terms of their compatibility with the Treaty.14 The Treaty 
provisions on State aid are very rudimentary, conferring on the Commission a broad 
discretion for developing substantive State aid policy through formal rule-making or 
informal guidelines. The EU State aid rules apply, in principle, to all industries and 
sectors, and were not developed for handling EU-wide financial crisis scenarios.15 
During the Crisis, it was even briefly considered to suspend the application of State 
aid rules altogether.16 However, with a very flexible and pragmatic approach, initially 
approving provisionally virtually all proposed aid measures, the Commission was able 
to play a critical role not only in facilitating the cross-border coordination of bailout 
interventions, but also in designing individual rescue measures envisaged by Member 
States.17 As Commissioner Almunia stated, on the basis of the State aid rules, the 
Commission had become the ‘de facto crisis-management and resolution authority at 
EU level.’18  
 
Since the heydays of the global financial crisis, the regulatory landscape has changed 
significantly. In accordance with the FSB’s Key Attributes, the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD)19 has established a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms20 (hereafter: ‘institutions’ or 
                                                        
14 TFEU, Arts 107-108. 
15 Damien M.B. Gerard, Managing The Financial Crisis In Europe: The Role Of EU State Aid Law 
Enforcement, in COMPETITION LAW AT TIMES OF ECONOMIC CRISIS – IN NEED FOR ADJUSTMENT? 
(Massimo Merola, Jacques Derenne & Jose Rivas, eds.)  231, 234  (2013) . 
16 JUAN JORGE PIERNAS LÓPEZ, THE CONCEPT OF STATE AID UNDER EU LAW: FROM INTERNAL MARKET 
TO COMPETITION AND BEYOND  221-222 (2015); Heimler & Jenny, supra note 13, at 362. 
17 Gerard, supra note 15. 
18 Joaquín Almunia, Banking Crisis, financial stability and State aid: The experience so far (Speech 
delivered in Brussels, March 8, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-223_en.htm. 
19 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending 
Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC. 2005/56/EC. 
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU/2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU No 1093/2010 and (EU) 
No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ EU L173/190 12.6.2014. 
20 Art 1(1) of the BRRD delineates its subject matter and scope which is identical that that of the CRD 
IV Regime (Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU). Accordingly, the recovery and 
resolution regime applies to credit institutions and investment firms established in the Union. Credit 
institutions are essentially deposit taking institutions, including commercial banks and universal banks. 
Investment firms are firms whose regular business consists of the provision of investment services to 
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‘financial institutions’) that provides national resolution authorities with an arsenal of 
extensive resolution tools and powers, as well as funding resources through national 
resolution financing arrangements.21 As part of the Euro-zone Banking Union, the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)22 adopts the BRRD resolution regime, but 
concentrates decision-making power in a Single Resolution Board,23 as the Euro-
zone’s integrated resolution authority. Whereas the BRRD applies across the EU and 
requires implementation based on minimum harmonization, the SRM is based on a 
directly applicable maximum harmonization measure in form of an EU regulation, but 
applies to Euro-zone countries only.24 Under BRRD and SRM, the application of 
resolution tools and powers is conceptualized as an alternative and exception to 
resolving a failing institution through ‘normal insolvency proceedings.’25 Similar to 
                                                                                                                                                              
third parties and/or the performance of investment activities on a professional basis, provided they are 
subject to an initial minimum capital requirement of EUR 730,000 (so called 730k investment firms).  
Thus, the regime is applicable to individual deposit taking institutions and (730k) securities firms 
within a holding company structure, as well as to the credit institution or investment firm parent and its 
individual deposit taking and (730k) securities subsidiaries. The BRRD applies further to financial 
holding companies established in the Union, ‘parent financial holding companies in a Member State,’ 
‘Union parent financial holding companies’, ‘mixed financial holding companies,’ ‘mixed-activity 
holding companies’ established in the Union, ‘parent mixed financial holding companies in a Member 
State,’ ‘EU parent mixed financial holding companies,’ and branches of credit institutions and 
investment firms that have their head office outside the Union, subject to specific conditions provided 
for in the Directive. The scope of the Directive is not limited to systemically important institutions; in 
principle, its regime applies to all covered institutions regardless of their size. 
21 The provisions of the BRRD have been effective since 1 January 2015, with the exception of the 
bail-in tool which had to be implemented by, and applied from, 1 January 2016 the latest; BRRD, Art 
130.  
22 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform 
rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in 
the framework of a single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ EU L 225/1 
30.7.2014 (SRMR). 
23 The SRB has been operational since 1 January 2015. The substantive provisions of the SRMR have 
been applicable from 1 January 2016; operational provisions have been effective from earlier dates; 
SRMR, Art 99.  
24 The scope of the SRB’s responsibility within the SRM is linked to the scope of the ECB’s 
competencies under the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Accordingly, the SRB is responsible for the 
resolution of credit institutions subject to direct ECB supervision established in a participating Member 
State, that is, either a Member State whose currency is the Euro or a Member State whose currency is 
not the Euro which has established a close cooperation in accordance with Art 7 of Regulation (EU) No 
1024/2013. It further applies to parent undertakings, including financial holding companies and mixed 
financial holding companies, established in a participating Member State, provided they are subject to 
consolidated supervision carried out by the ECB, as well as investment firms and financial institutions 
established in a participating Member State, where they are covered by the consolidated supervision of 
the parent undertaking carried out by the ECB. National resolution authorities are responsible for the 
resolution of other financial institutions within the scope of the SRM.  
25 BRRD, Art 32(1)(c) and (5), 32b; SRMR, Art 18(1)(c) and (5). ‘Normal insolvency proceedings’ are 
defined as ‘collective insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of the debtor 
and the appointment of a liquidator or an administrator normally applicable to institutions under 
national law and either specific to those institutions or generally applicable to any natural or legal 
person;’ BRRD, Art 2(1.)(47). 
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the relationship between OLA and the Bankruptcy Code, where the conditions for 
resolution are not satisfied, ‘normal insolvency proceedings’ apply as the default 
option for dealing with distressed financial firms. However, regardless of whether a 
failing institution is resolved through the BRRD/SRM resolution regime or under 
national standard insolvency law, any mobilization of financial resources that meets 
the definition of ‘aid’ will be subject to the EU State aid framework. 
 
Thus, what emerges is a complex trifurcated system of bailout regimes at EU level:26 
A financial institution that does not meet the conditions for resolution under 
BRRD/SRM may be resolved under the applicable national corporate insolvency law, 
which may entail the granting of State aid in which case notification to and approval 
of the aid by the Commission will be required. The resolution of an institution under 
BRRD/SRM may require the granting and approval of State aid at various stages: 
fund aid through the resolution financing arrangements, state aid that goes beyond the 
fund aid limit, aid granted through government financial stabilization tools, and Direct 
Bank Recapitalization through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Finally, in 
certain scenarios the possibility of granting State aid outside the BRRD/SRM 
resolution framework or national corporate insolvency law remains. Thus, corporate 
insolvency law, the BRRD/SRM resolution framework and the EU State aid regime 
                                                        
26 This is, of course, a simplification. There are currently at least 28 (including the UK which is due to 
leave the EU in 2019) different national corporate insolvency laws that apply in accordance with the 
‘home Member State’ principle. Under the latter, where an institution has obtained authorization (its 
‘banking license’) determines the applicable resolution and insolvency law. Each national corporate 
insolvency law may provide a number of different procedures which may be judicial, administrative or 
of a hybrid nature. For example, an institution that has obtained its banking license in Germany may be 
resolved through the following procedures: (i) German corporate insolvency law which consists of the 
standard insolvency procedure pursuant to the Insolvenzordnung (InsO), modified for financial 
institutions by the Kreditwesengesetz (KWG); in addition to liquidation, the standard insolvency 
procedure allows for modifications in the form of the insolvency plan procedure and the process of 
self-administration, which may be combined. Further, a special act, the KredReorgG, provides 
specifically for financial institutions a separate ‘restoration procedure’ and a ‘reorganization 
procedure.’ (ii) If the institution is a credit institution it will be subject to the SRM, so that its 
resolution will be governed by the directly applicable SRM Regulation as well as the German law 
implementing the BRRD, that is the Gesetz zur Sanierung und Abwicklung von Instituten und 
Finanzgruppen (SAG), provided resolution is in the public interest (as defined). If the institution is 
under direct ECB supervision, it will be within the remit of the SRB as resolution authority. (iii) 
Finally, there is the EU State aid regime which may apply in combination with (i) or (ii), and in certain 
limited circumstances may apply on its own. To further complicate matters, the BRRD gives Member 
States a wide range of transposition options resulting in significant national divergences; 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, EURO AREA POLICIES: FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 
TECHNICAL NOTE – BANK RESOLUTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT (IMF Country Report No 18/232, 
July 2018) para 23 with Annex I.            
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form a complex law-related system27 for dealing with failing financial firms. These 
elements do not coexist as isolated silos, but are more akin to a system of 
communicating vessels, with a multitude of interactions and interdependencies.28            
 
Combining system analysis29 and the concept of regulatory legitimacy, this article 
comprehensively examines the EU post-crisis bank bailout system. Its central claim is 
that the current system calibration invites bailout decisions that are lacking in 
legitimacy because the system is unlikely to produce outputs that match the system’s 
purpose of limiting bailouts to those that are likely to be ‘pie-increasing’ and 
desirable. These shortcomings should be addressed primarily through re-calibrating 
interconnections in a way that would transform the BRRD/SRM resolution 
framework into the EU’s Bank Resolution and Insolvency Code, similar to the legal 
framework of FDIC receiverships for deposit taking institutions in the US. The 
BRRD/SRM resolution framework would no longer be (just) an alternative to national 
insolvency law as the default option; it would be the only show in town with national 
corporate insolvency laws and the EU State aid regime resigned to supporting roles 
within the resolution framework. The modification of system elements, notably 
through the setting of appropriate levels of MREL, may facilitate overall goal 
attainment capacity. Section II seeks to elucidate the notion of ‘bailout’ as a non-
technical term of limited precision, in contradistinction to the legal concept of ‘State 
aid’ in EU law, which has been fleshed out on the basis of extensive case law. In 
Section III the complex notion of regulatory ‘legitimacy’ is introduced as a suitable 
standard of assessment for a law-related system. The twin aspects of ‘input 
legitimacy’ and ‘output legitimacy’ are here multidimensional: input legitimacy can 
be assessed in respect of both ‘system setup’ and ‘system design;’ output legitimacy 
relates to both the individual system elements as well as the system overall. The 
                                                        
27 In system analysis, a system may be defined as an interconnected set of elements that is coherently 
organized in a way that achieves a certain purpose. Thus a system consists of elements, 
interconnections and a function or purpose; DONELLA MEADOWS, THINKING IN SYSTEMS – A PRIMER –
(Diana Wright, ed.) 11 (2009). The EU bailout system constitutes a concrete ‘law-related’ system: it 
exists in physical space-time with real people and physical objects the interactions of which are to no 
small extent determined by formal law; Lynn LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 Cornell L. 
Rev. 479, 488 (1997) (explaining the notion of a concrete law-related system).   
28 In a set of interlinked vessels, a homogenous fluid will always settle at the same level in each vessel, 
regardless of the shape or volume of individual vessels. This is because gravity and pressure are 
constant in each vessel. 
29 According to LoPucki, ‘to “analyse” a system is to break it down into its constituent parts, to 
determine the nature and identity of its subsystems, and to explain the relationships among them; 
LoPucki, supra note 27, at 482-483. 
 8 
output legitimacy of the system overall will be the focus of the analysis. It is 
determined by the effective and efficient attainment of the overall system purpose, 
which is mandated by international standard setters: to limit bailouts to those that are 
welfare enhancing and desirable (‘pie-increasing’). A bailout system is likely to 
facilitate pie-increasing bailouts if the eligibility criteria and intra-system interactions 
are calibrated in such a way that the social benefits of a bailout are likely to exceed its 
social costs. The social costs of bailouts may be kept in check through appropriate 
cost reduction mechanisms, in particular, in the form of loss allocation and burden 
sharing rules. Section IV maps the different bailout cost reduction mechanism under 
standard corporate insolvency law, the BRRD/SRM resolution framework and the 
State aid regime. Whereas standard corporate insolvency law provides the most 
stringent burden sharing mechanism, the State aid framework is the most lenient, with 
BRRD/SRM as a compromise arrangement in-between. Section V critically evaluates 
the eligibility criteria for each system element and the intra-system interactions. On 
the basis of the first cases resolved under the new system, it demonstrates that the 
overall framework appears to be flawed. It invites bailouts that are unlikely to be ‘pie-
increasing’ and may even be used to defeat the entire purpose of the post-crisis 
resolution framework. Section VI concludes with suggestions for improving the 
system’s goal attainment capacity. 
 
II. Terminology: Bailout versus State aid 
 
‘Bailout’ is not a technical term and is often used in a somewhat fuzzy way. The 
elaboration of a commonly accepted definition is impaired by the great variety that 
government interventions in the financial sector (and beyond) may take. As a first 
general categorization, these measures may be divided into liquidity assistance and 
solvency assistance.30 The former is ideally aimed at institutions with healthy balance 
sheets that suffer a temporary liquidity shortage.31 Liquidity assistance may take the 
                                                        
30 Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. Corp. L. 469, 483-484 (201)); 
Posner & Casey, supra note 7, at 522-523; Christos Hadjiemmanuil, Limits on State-Funded Bailouts in 
the EU Bank Resolution Regime, 2016.2 EUROPEAN ECONOMY 91, 95 (2016). 
31 The classic exposition is WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY 
MARKET (Seven Treasures Publications, 2009) 26 (1873): ‘A panic, in a word, is a species of neuralgia, 
and according to the rules of science you must not starve it. The holders of the cash reserve must be 
ready not only to keep it for their own liabilities, but to advance it most freely for the liabilities of 
others. They must lend to merchants, to minor bankers, to ‘this man and that man,’ whenever the 
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form of (short term) lending by central banks to institutions by way of monetary 
operations or on an individual basis through emergency liquidity assistance, or 
governments may provide state guarantees to central banks for their refinancing 
exposures, and/or may guarantee newly issued debt of institutions so as to facilitate 
access to credit markets, and/or may lend to institutions directly on a temporary 
basis.32 By contrast, solvency assistance seeks to restore the balance sheet of an 
institution that has sustained a capital shortfall. This may require a recapitalization 
through the purchase by the government of capital instruments in the form of equity, 
hybrid instruments or subordinated debt. In addition, or alternatively, governments 
may directly or indirectly assume the risk associated with impaired (non-performing) 
assets.33 These may be removed from a bank’s balance sheet in exchange for 
consideration and parked in a government sponsored asset management vehicle, a so-
called ‘bad bank,’ to be wound down as markets improve. Alternatively, the 
government may ‘guarantee’ asset values by entering into loss sharing arrangements 
under which losses incurred by the institution on an asset portfolio exceeding a certain 
threshold would be covered by the State. As a last resort, an institution may be 
nationalized which involves the expropriation of its owners/shareholders and the 
assumption by the government of operating losses.34 Although conceptually clearly 
differentiated, in practical terms, illiquidity and insolvency are linked and closely 
interdependent; given that assessment will often be a matter of subjective judgment, 
both concepts will often be indistinguishable, in particular in a crisis scenario.35   
                                                                                                                                                              
security is good. In wild periods of alarm, one failure makes many, and the best way to prevent the 
derivative failures is to arrest the primary failure which causes them.’ See also Paul Tucker, The lender 
of last resort: regimes for stability and legitimacy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CENTRAL BANKING 
(Peter Conti-Brown and Rosa Maria Lastra, eds) 535, 536-537 (2018).   
32 Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 30, at 96. 
33 Id. 
34 Gerard Hertig, Governments as Investors of Last Resort: Comparative Credit Crisis Case-Studies, 13 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 385, 388-390 (2012); Ana Petrovic & Ralf Tutsch, National Rescue 
Measures in Response to the Current Financial Crisis, ECB LEGAL WORKING PAPER SERIES No 8 
(July 2009), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp8.pdf?23b81a456ecb550cfcd1b693d4f10685.  
35 Wolf-Georg Ringe, Bail-in between Liquidity and Solvency, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD LEGAL 
RESEARCH PAPER No 33/2016 22-23 (January 2017); Martin Hellwig, Precautionary Recapitalization: 
Time for Review, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS (July 2017) para 3.3 (available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/602089/IPOL_IDA(2017)602089_EN.pdf)
: ‘Greek banks passed the comprehensive assessment in 2014 without problems, were considered to be 
solvent until June 2015, were considered to be insolvent in early July 2015, and were considered 
solvent again a few month later. … Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca were treated as 
solvent, merely in need of a precautionary recapitalization in one week and then as likely to fail and 
due to be wound down the next week;’ Tucker, supra note 31, 545: ‘The future is uncertain. Economic 
and financial conditions can turn out better or worse than expected. For that reason alone, a firm might 
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As a second categorization, State interventions may be distinguished in accordance 
with the sources of funding. These may be the central bank, general government 
revenue, or standing bailout funds. Acting as the lender of last resort, central banks 
extend (emergency) liquidity facilities to member banks in exchange for high quality 
collateral and a penal interest rate.36 The central bank can freely create liquidity by 
lending to its member banks.37 This increases the money supply and carries the risk of 
inflation, which may be addressed through offsetting measures, such as the 
simultaneous sale of securities or the supply of highly liquid government bonds 
instead of reserves.38 Where the recipient is solvent, the loan will be repaid and there 
will be no cost for the government or the taxpayer.39 Should the recipient default, 
however, the government accounts will be affected indirectly: central banks distribute 
part of their profits to the government and reduced profits may result in a larger 
government deficit.40 The latter ensues where spending outflows exceed the inflow of 
collected taxes into the government’s general account. The difference will be made up 
through government borrowing in the form of government bonds issued through the 
money markets.41 Bank bailouts drawing on general government revenue frequently 
result in a significant increase in public debt and higher interest payments. In the 
course of the implementation of the BRRD and the SRM, bailout funds have been 
established in form of national financing arrangements and the Euro-zone Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF). Financed, in principle, through risk-calibrated ex ante 
contributions of financial institutions, these funds may be used to ensure the effective 
                                                                                                                                                              
reasonably be judged solvent at the point at which a loan is granted but later become insolvent. …, a 
solvency judgment is inherently probabilistic.’    
36 JOSH RYAN-COLLINS, TONY GREENHAM, RICHARD WERNER & ANDREW JACKSON, WHERE DOES 
MONEY COME FROM? 79-80 (2012). 
37 Id. at 67, 103. 
38 Block (2010), supra note 7, at 181. 
39 Posner & Casey, supra note 7, at 522. 
40 Block (2010), supra note 7, at 183-185. Under the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the 
provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) is the responsibility of the relevant national 
central bank who will incur the costs and risk associated with the granting of ELA, unless the relevant 
government acts as guarantor; AGREEMENT ON EMERGENCY LIQUIDITY ASSISTANCE (17 May 2017) 
para. 2 (available at   
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Agreement_on_emergency_liquidity_assistance_20170517.e
n.pdf?23bb6a68e85e0715839088d0a23011db); EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, CONVERGENCE REPORT 
(May 2018) 27. See also Tucker, supra note 31, 539: ‘A central bank will cover its losses by writing 
down its capital or by paying less seigniorage over to the government. Either way, that simply transfers 
the costs to government. Ultimately, losses are a fiscal issue. They must be covered by higher taxation 
(or lower public spending) or by higher seiniorage, ie, resorting to inflation as a tax.’   
41 RYAN-COLLINS, GREENHAM, WERNER & JACKSON, supra note 36, at 122. 
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application of resolution tools and powers and to absorb losses to a limited extent.42 In 
the end, however, bailout funds are always backed by an implicit State guarantee and 
the government will step in, drawing on its general revenue, should the funds turn out 
to be insufficient. This will remain true even under current plans according to which 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)43 will provide a common backstop to the 
SRF in the form of a revolving credit line.44 The ESM is ultimately funded by its 
members, currently all Euro-zone Member States.45     
 
The various bailout definitions that have been suggested in the literature cover these 
measures more or less comprehensively (and are not necessarily limited to financial 
sector bailouts). In an early attempt at developing a systematic bailout policy, Cheryl 
Block has defined ‘bailout’ as ‘a form of government assistance or intervention 
specifically designed or intended to assist enterprises facing financial distress and to 
prevent enterprise failure.’46 The focus on firm failure and its prevention distinguishes 
a bailout from general subsidies, which are geared towards the achievement of 
broader policy or regulatory rationales through incentivizing a certain desired 
behavior or activity.47 A ‘stimulus,’ by contrast, is a form of subsidy that ‘tends to be 
forward looking, designed to spark economic growth or redevelopment.’48 Subsequent 
definitions can be divided into two groups. First, there are those that focus on the 
assumption by the government of the losses or risks of private enterprise. According 
to Anabtawi and Schwarcz, a bailout entails the allocation by the government of the 
losses of an illiquid or insolvent firm to itself;49 for Levitin, a bailout is the 
government’s allocation of a failed firm’s losses to itself;50 and Manns views bailouts 
as investments in private companies to provide liquidity and stability during financial 
                                                        
42 See infra Part III.3) and IV.2). 
43 The ESM is an international institution under public international law, established for the purpose of 
providing funding and stability support for the benefit of ESM members, currently all Euro-zone 
countries, experiencing severe financing problems; MICHAEL SCHILLIG, RESOLUTION AND INSOLVENCY 
OF BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2016) 347-348 (para 12.68).   
44 As agreed by the heads of state and government of the euro area countries at the Euro Summit on 14 
December 2018; see TERM SHEET ON THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM REFORM (4 December 
2018) (available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37267/esm-term-sheet-
041218_final_clean.pdf). 
45 SCHILLIG, supra note 43, at 348 (para. 12.70). 
46 Block (1992), supra note 7, at 960. 
47 Id. at 956. 
48 Block (2010), supra note 7, at 160. 
49 Iman Anabtawi and Steven L Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Adress the Inevitability 
of Financial Failure, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 75, 103 (2013).  
50 Levitin, supra note 7, at 439. 
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crisis, which entails the government’s assumption of risk.51 On the other hand, there 
are those who focus on the protection from losses of private enterprise through 
government intervention. According to Posner and Casey, a ‘bailout occurs when the 
government makes payments (including loans, loan guarantees, cash, and other types 
of consideration) to a liquidity-constrained private agent in order to enable that agent 
to pay its creditors and counterparties, when the agent is not entitled to those 
payments under a statutory scheme.’52 For Rasmussen and Skeel, a bailout is 
government funding that ‘protects creditors or shareholders from losses that they 
would otherwise suffer, … regardless of whether the government actually loses any 
money in the effort.’53 This second category is more inclusive, as it covers 
interventions regardless of whether the government suffers any losses or assumes any 
risks itself. It seems preferable because moral hazard may ensue and market discipline 
may be impaired as soon as market participants can expect to be protected from 
losses; whether any of these losses will end up with the State and taxpayer is 
immaterial. All these definitions are merely descriptive and carry no normative force.  
 
By contrast, the EU law notion of ‘State aid’ is a technical term with a defined legal 
meaning. A national measure amounts to ‘State aid’ if it cumulatively meets four 
conditions: ‘First, there must be an intervention by the State or through State 
resources. Second, the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member 
States. Third, it must confer an advantage on the recipient. Fourth, it must distort or 
threaten to distort competition.’54 The advantage conferred must be ‘such as to favour 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods over others which are in a 
legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by 
the measure in question.’55 These elements are complex and all of them are highly 
contested.56 The notions of ‘State aid’ and ‘bailout’ do not perfectly overlap. State 
guarantees and loans granted to ailing financial institutions, impaired asset measures 
and recapitalizations are typical bailouts and also amount to (possibly Treaty-
                                                        
51 Manns, supra note 7, at 1358. 
52 Posner & Casey, supra note 7, at 481. 
53 Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 7, at 10. 
54 C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft 
Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht ECLI:EU:C:2003:415 para 
75. 
55 C-409/00 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2003:92 para 47. 
56 Andrea Biondi, State Aid is Falling Down, Falling Down: An Analysis of the Case Law on the 
Notion of Aid, 50 C.M.L. REV. 1719 (2013) (discussing the notion of State aid). 
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conform) State aid. However, according to Commission practice, central bank 
liquidate facilities that are collateralized and charge a penal interest rate do not 
amount to state aid provided the beneficiary is solvent.57 The Commission justifies 
this analysis with a lack of selectivity ‘where a central bank reacts to a banking crisis 
with general measures open to all comparable market players … rather than with 
selective measures in favour of individual banks.’58 Although this does not seem to be 
in line with established case law pursuant to which measures to an entire sector can be 
selective,59 it may perhaps be justified on the basis that only banks maintain reserve 
accounts with central banks and are therefore factually in a special situation.60 It may 
also be argued that the creation of central bank reserves cost nothing61 and does not 
amount to an effective burden on the State (and is therefore not ‘granted by the State 
or through State resources’). However, central bank facilities clearly shield the 
recipient’s counterparties from losses that they would otherwise have to bear and 
therefore would presumably amount to bailouts under those definitions that focus on 
the neutralization of investors’ losses.62 On the other hand, general subsidies – 
measures that pursue certain industrial63 or environmental64 policy goals regardless of 
any losses incurred by the beneficiaries would not generally be regarded as bailouts, 
but are likely to amount to State aid. 
 
III. Regulatory Legitimacy and Law-Related System Analysis 
 
 
To analyze the EU bailout system means breaking it down into its component parts as 
subsystems: national corporate insolvency law, the BRRD/SRM resolution 
framework, and the EU State aid regime; and to examine how these system elements 
                                                        
57 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION ON THE APPLICATION, FROM 1 AUGUST 2013, OF STATE AID 
RULES TO SUPPORT MEASURES IN FAVOUR OF BANKS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
(‘BANKING COMMUNICATION’), OJ EU 30.7.2013 C216/1; para 62.   
58 COMMISSION NOTICE ON THE NOTION OF STATE AID AS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 107(1) OF THE 
TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, OJ EU 19.17.2016 C262/1 fn 71. 
59 Cases 6/69 and 11/69 Commission v France ECLI:EU:C:1969:68; 173/73 Italy v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:71; C-241/94 France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1996:353; C-75/97 Belgium v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:311. 
60 Szymon Gebski, Competition First? Application of State Aid Rules in the Banking Sector, 6 
COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 89, 93 (2009). 
61 RYAN-COLLINS, GREENHAM, WERNER & JACKSON, supra note 36, at 67. 
62 Only Block is explicit about this: Block (2010), supra note 7, 174. 
63 e.g. C-88/03 Portugal v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:511. 
64 e.g. C-487/06P British Aggregates v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2008:757; C-379/98 Preussen Elektra 
AG v Schleswag AG  ECLI:EU:C:2001:160. 
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relate to one another and contribute to the functioning of the system as a whole. The 
emphasis in system analysis is on interactions rather than on the system elements 
themselves, with a view to improving the system’s functioning.65 This requires a 
standard of assessment as to whether the system overall performs well and produces 
on average ‘good’ results, even though individual outcomes may be questionable. In 
this respect, a law-related system may be assessed on the basis of its ‘legitimacy.’ In 
political science, ‘legitimacy’ is a difficult concept and may, for present purposes, be 
defined as the acceptance by the public of ‘authoritative’ decisions without having to 
be coerced even if in individual cases outcomes may violate (some) community 
members’ normative preferences.66 Democratic legitimacy almost exclusively rests on 
two types of normative arguments: ‘input legitimacy’ and ‘output legitimacy.’67 The 
former relates to institutional arrangements that seek to ensure that governing 
processes are generally responsive to the normative preferences of the governed – its 
focus is essentially procedural. The latter is concerned with the adoption of effective 
solutions to common problems of the governed, focusing primarily on the substance 
of decision-making.68 In democratic political systems, input legitimacy generally 
requires the direct or indirect participation of the governed in policy choices. 
However, financial regulation and supervision may require complex and sensitive 
decisions that can result in immediate and highly visible short term pain – e.g. the 
imposition of early intervention measures on a seemingly highly profitable institution; 
with any potential long term benefits only accruing over time.69 In order to address 
the potential for political opportunism under these circumstances, in a regulatory 
context, direct political accountability will usually be substituted for independent 
regulatory bodies that have the necessary expertise and professional integrity, and can 
                                                        
65 LoPucki, supra note 27, at 487. 
66 Fritz Scharpf, Problem-Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU, MPIFG 
WORKING PAPER 03/1, 2 (Feb. 2003); Tanja A. Börzel & Diana Panke, Network Governance: effective 
and legitimate?, in THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIC NETWORK GOVERNANCE (Eva Sørensen & Jacob 
Torfing, eds.) 153, 160 (2008). See further MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY I 31-38 (1978). 
67 Recently, a third normative criterion has been added: ‘throughput legitimacy;’ Vivian Schmidt, 
Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput,’ 61 
POLITICAL STUDIES 2, 5-6 (2013). It focuses on the quality of interaction among the actors involved in 
the decision making process. This procedural focus puts throughput legitimacy in close proximity to 
input legitimacy concerns, in particular in a regulatory context where both criteria would seem to be 
almost indistinguishable. 
68 Scharpf, supra note 66, at 3. 
69 Anat Keller, Independence, accountability and transparency: are the conventional accountability 
mechanisms suitable for the European Systemic Risk Board?, 28 ICCLR 176, 181 (2017). 
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act with fairness, accountability, transparency and policy coherence.70 Output 
legitimacy ensues when a policy decision serves the common good of the respective 
constituency. It derives from the capacity of a regulatory system to effectively solve 
common problems that cannot be sufficiently addressed through individual action, 
market exchanges or voluntary cooperation in civil society.71 A regulatory system is 
effective in this sense if it produces results that solve problems and satisfy the 
demands it was designed to cope with (‘goal attainment; problem-solving capacity’) 
without delays or deadlocks and at reasonable cost (‘efficiency’).72 An assessment on 
this basis presupposes the identification of a common problem that the regulatory 
system is designed to solve and the definition of a system goal, the attainment of 
which benefits the relevant constituency as a whole; rather than merely certain narrow 
private interests.73 An indication of a public interest serving policy choice is its ‘pie-
enlarging’ effect, as opposed to a merely zero-sum re-distribution of resources from 
one group to another. However, even an overall Kaldor-Hicks efficient decision may 
be suspect where the benefits disproportionately accrue to one societal group at the 
expense of another.74 
 
Generally, both input and output legitimacy arguments are relevant for sustaining the 
legitimacy of a regulatory system; although one cannot fully substitute the complete 
lack of the other, trade-offs are possible – reduced input legitimacy may be 
compensated for by enhanced output legitimacy and vice versa.75 In particular, a 
regulatory system that is likely to produce results that increase overall welfare in 
society, i.e. is a positive-sum game, may be able to tolerate less than optimal input 
legitimacy parameters without compromising overall legitimacy.76                                
 
                                                        
70 Giandomenico Majone, Regulatory legitimacy, in REGULATING EUROPE (Giandomenico Majone, 
ed.) 284, 285-286 (1996); Schmidt, supra note 67, at 14-15. It is not always clear, whether these 
considerations should be part of input or output legitimacy or form the separate category of throughout 
legitimacy; id. at 14. Because of their procedural focus, input legitimacy seems to be the appropriate 
category.  
71 Scharpf, supra note 66, at 3-4; FRITZ SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND 
DEMOCRATIC? 11 (1999). 
72 Börzel & Panke, supra note 66, at 157. 
73 Jerry L. Marshaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. 
REV. 849, 867(1980). 
74 Block (1992) supra note 7, 1002. 
75 Scharpf, supra note 66, at 5. 
76 Majone, supra note 70, at 294. 
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Assessing the legitimacy of the EU bailout system on this basis is a multidimensional 
exercise. Input legitimacy is relevant, first, at the macro-level in respect of the system 
setup. The question here is whether the system itself as a policy choice can be 
justified on the basis of input legitimacy considerations. It is relevant, secondly, in 
respect of system design: can input legitimacy arguments be relied on to justify 
system outcomes. Output legitimacy may be assessed, first, at the level of the various 
system elements; and, secondly, at the level of the system overall.    
 
1) Input Legitimacy I: System Setup 
 
The input legitimacy of the system setup concerns the issue of whether the installation 
of the system through its constituting elements meets the normative requirements of 
participation and responsiveness, or, in the regulatory context, of independence, 
expertise, accountability and transparency. A detailed analysis is rendered 
exceedingly complex by the emanation of the system elements from various 
constitutional orders and regulatory spheres.  
 
At EU level, (corporate) insolvency law regulation for financial institutions is limited 
to a conflict of laws instrument containing mainly rules on jurisdiction, the applicable 
law and the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions. Directive 2001/24/EC 
on the reorganization and winding up of credit institutions and investment firms 
(DRWCI)77 adopts a ‘universalist’ approach: measures concerning the reorganization 
or winding up of an institution taken by the administrative or judicial authorities of its 
home Member States on the basis of the law of that Member State are automatically 
recognized by, and effective in, all other Member States.78 Under the DRWCI, 
jurisdiction and applicable law are not based on the Centre of Main Interests (COMI) 
concept;79 in accordance with the principle of home Member State supervision, the 
                                                        
77  Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the 
reorganization and winding up of credit institutions, OJ 5.5.2001 L125/15. 
78 DRWCI, Recital (16). 
79 The recast European Insolvency Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast) OJ EU 5.6.2015 L141/19) does 
not apply to credit institutions, investment firms, and other firms to the extent that they are covered by 
the DRWCI; EUIR, Art 1(2). The DRWCI has been amended to bring its scope fully in line with the 
BRRD; BRRD, Art 117. 
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connecting factor is the authorization of the institution in its home Member State.80 
By contrast, substantive corporate insolvency law is a matter for individual Member 
States and remains fragmented.81 In its initial plan for establishing a legal framework 
for dealing with ailing financial institutions, the Commission also considered 
examining the need for further harmonization of bank insolvency regimes, with the 
aim of resolving and liquidating them under the same substantive and procedural 
rules.82 Thus far, the BRRD has only harmonized to a limited extent the order of 
priority under national law in both resolution and standard insolvency proceedings.83 
Consequently, Member States are currently free to apply their standard corporate 
insolvency law to financial institutions, or may device a corporate insolvency law that 
is specific to financial institutions, which may be a court-centered judicial system, 
administrative in nature or a hybrid system combining elements of both.84 A number 
of commentators have recently highlighted the urgent need for harmonizing and 
perhaps unifying bank insolvency law in the banking union.85  
 
                                                        
80 DRWCI, Art 3(1) and 9(1). 
81 So far only a non-binding Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency 
has been issued by the Commission, encouraging Member States to put in place a framework that 
enables the efficient restructuring of viable enterprises in financial difficulties; Commission 
Recommendation of 12.3.2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, C(2014) 1500 
final. Drawing on the experience with the Recommendation and on national regimes that work well, 
the Commission has published a Proposal for a Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks, 
second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge 
procedures. If enacted the Directive would not apply to credit institutions and investment firms. 
European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of 
restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU COM(2016) 
723 final. As part of its Proposal for a Directive on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery 
of collateral, the Commission has also proposed an accelerated collateral enforcement procedure as an 
efficient out-of-court mechanism with a view to allowing mainly banks as secured creditors to more 
swiftly recover the collateral securing the repayment of non-performing loans; European Commission, 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit servicers, credit 
purchasers and the recovery of collateral  COM(2018) 135 final.    
82 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Central Bank: An 
EU Framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector, COM(2010) 579 final. 
83 See infra Part IV.1). 
84 Binder et al., supra note 12. 
85 Id at 3; Agnès Bénasy-Quéré, Markus Brunnermeier, Henrik Enderlein, Emmanuel Farhi, Marcel 
Fratzscher, Clemens Fuest, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Philippe Martin, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Hélène Rey, 
Isabel Schnabel, Nicolas Véron, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Reconciling risk 
sharing with market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC 
POLICY RESEARCH POLICY INSIGHT NO. 91 6 (January 2018); Fernando Restoy, Bail-in in the new bank 
resolution framework: is there an issue with the middle class? SPEECH AT THE IADI-ERC 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, NAPLES, ITALY, 23 MARCH 2018 at 6 (available at 
https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp180323.htm); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 26, para 
26, 27.  
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The BRRD provides the rulebook for bank resolution across the EU internal market. 
As a directive,86 it is binding on the Member States, but in principle not within the 
Member States, which must implement it into national law with a view to achieving 
the intended result.87 The BRRD is supported, and its provisions specified, by a range 
of ‘regulatory technical standards’ and ‘implementing technical standards,’88 as well 
as soft-law guidelines issued by the European Banking Authority (EBA). The SRM 
establishes, by way of a directly applicable regulation,89 a framework that relies on a 
division of responsibilities between a central decision-making level, through the 
Single Resolution Board (SRB) in conjunction with the ECB, the Commission and the 
Council, and local implementation by national resolution authorities.90 For the 
substantive resolution rules, the SRM either specifically refers to the rules of the 
BRRD or repeats certain provisions so as to provide the SRB with directly applicable 
EU law as the legal basis for its decisions.91 The resolution schemes devised by the 
SRB are to be implemented by national resolution authorities on the basis of national 
law transposing the BRRD.92 
 
The EU State Aid regime is sparsely regulated in Arts 107-109 TFEU, with a general 
prohibition of state aid,93 mandatory94 and discretionary exemptions,95 procedural 
                                                        
86 TFEU, Art 288(3). 
87 The BRRD is a minimum harmonization measure only and leaves some room for national deviations 
and adaptations; see further INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 26, para 23 with Annex I. 
88 The former are delegated acts that are technical in nature and do not imply any strategic decisions or 
policy choices; the latter are implementing acts that are also technical in nature and merely determine 
the conditions for the application of the directive. Generally, delegated acts are adopted by the 
Commission on the basis of a power delegated to it in a legislative act that specifies the objectives, 
content, scope and duration of the delegation of power; TFEU, Art 290. Delegated acts are of general 
application, supplementing or amending certain non-essential elements of the legislative act; the 
essential elements of an area are reserved for the legislative act and are not subject to a delegation of 
power. Implementing acts are adopted by the Commission, on the basis of implementing powers 
conferred on it by either legislative or delegated acts, where uniform conditions for implementing 
legally binding Union acts are needed; TFEU, Art. 291. Implementing acts execute legislative or 
delegated acts without amending or supplementing them, although in practice it may be difficult to 
determine whether this is the case or not. Any of these acts may take the form of a regulation, a 
directive or a decision. Regulatory technical standards and implementing technical standards are 
drafted by the relevant European Supervisory Authority (ESA) following public consultation and a 
cost-benefit analysis. The standards are then subject to endorsement by the Commission. See CARSTEN 
GERNER-BEUERLE AND MICHAEL SCHILLIG, COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW 90-97 (2019).   
89 TFEU, Art 288(2). 
90 SRMR, Recital 11. 
91 SRMR, Recital 18. 
92 SRMR, Art 18(9), 29. 
93 Art 107(1) TFEU. 
94 Art 107(2) TFEU. 
95 Art 107(3) TFEU. 
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rules96 and a basis for secondary legislation.97 The latter has been used to codify 
Commission practice and case law on procedural matters.98 An enabling regulation 
allows the Commission to exempt certain forms of horizontal aid from notification,99 
which in turn formed the basis for the Commission’s regulation on block 
exemptions.100 However, the Commission predominantly relies on soft law 
instruments in which it specifies its intended approach to the compatibility assessment 
of aid measures under the various exemptions. Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008, the Commission assesses the compatibility of State aid in the 
financial sector on the basis of Art 107(3)(b): the exemption with a view ‘to remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State.’ Following the first Banking 
Communication of October 2008,101 the Commission has issued three further soft law 
measures: the Recapitalization Communication102 focusing on the pricing of 
recapitalizations, the Impaired Assets Communication103 addressing in particular the 
valuation of impaired assets, and the Restructuring Communication104 setting out 
restructuring demands as quid pro quo for having received government assistance. 
Going through several phases, the Commission’s standard of assessment gradually 
moved from a very lenient towards a more rigorous approach making aid 
compatibility dependent on increasingly stricter conditions.105 This approach was 
                                                        
96 Art 108 TFEU. 
97 Art 109 TFEU. 
98 Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ EC 27.3.1999 L83/1; amended by Council Regulation 
(EU) No 734/2013 of 22 July 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules 
for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ EU 31.7.2013 L204/16. 
99 Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community to certain categories of horizontal State aid, OJ EC 
14.5.98 L142/1; amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 733/2013 of 22 July 2013 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 994/98 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community to certain categories of horizontal aid, OJ EU 31.7.2013 L204/11.  
100 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ EU 
26.6.2014 L187/1, replacing the earlier Commission Regulation (EU) No 800/2008. 
101 COMMUNICATION ON THE APPLICATION OF STATE AID RULES TO MEASURES TAKEN IN RELATION TO 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, OJ EU 
25.10.2008 C270/8. 
102 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION – THE RECAPITALIZATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS: LIMITATION OF AID TO THE MINIMUM NECESSARY AND SAFEGUARDS 
AGAINST UNDUE DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITION, OJ EU 15.1.2009 C10/2.  
103 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION ON THE TREATMENT OF IMPAIRED ASSETS IN THE 
COMMUNITY BANKING SECTOR, OJ EU 26.3.2009 C72/1. 
104 COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON THE RETURN TO VIABILITY AND THE ASSESSMENT OF 
RESTRUCTURING MEASURES IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN THE CURRENT CRISIS UNDER THE STATE AID 
RULES, OJ EU 19.8.2009 C195/9. 
105 Thomas Doleys, Managing State Aid in a Time of Crisis: Commission Crisis Communications and 
the Financial Sector Bailout, 34 J. EUR. INTEGR. 549-565 (2012). 
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codified in the 2013 Banking Communication,106 which has replaced the earlier 2008 
Banking Communication, and adapts and complements the Recapitalization and 
Impaired Assets Communications, and supplements the Restructuring 
Communication.107 The legal nature of the Banking Communication has been 
clarified by the Court of Justice in Kotnik:108 By issuing this soft law measure the 
Commission imposed a limit on the exercise of its discretion. Any departure puts the 
Commission at risk of being in breach of the principle of equal treatment and the 
protection of legitimate expectations. However, the adoption of guidelines does not 
relieve the Commission of its obligation to examine the specific exceptional 
circumstances relied on by a Member State. In other words, the Commission must, in 
principle, authorize a proposed aid measure that complies with the guidelines; on the 
other hand, a Member State may still notify the Commission of aid that does not 
comply with the guidelines and the Commission may authorize the proposed aid in 
exceptional circumstances. 
 
Given this diversity of regulatory spheres and instruments, assessing the input 
legitimacy of the system setup requires an investigation of both (i) the constitutional 
orders of the Member States and their law making powers in the realm of corporate 
insolvency law; and (ii) the EU law making process in all its facets, including Treaty 
making by the Member States (TFEU, Art 107-109), the ordinary legislative 
procedure (DRWCI, BRRD and SRM), as well as delegated law making and the 
Comitology process (regulatory and implementing technical standard, Commission 
communications). Some general observations must suffice. The European Union is 
committed to the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights.109 Under the so-called Copenhagen 
criteria for accession, any country wishing to become an EU member must have 
stable institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law.110 Of course, despite 
these Treaty commitments the reality may be very different. The World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators111 show great diversity across EU Member States: 
                                                        
106 BANKING COMMUNICATION, supra note 57. 
107 Id. para 24. 
108 C-526/14 Kotnik and others ECLI:EU:C:2016:570 para 38-44. 
109 TEU, Art 2. 
110 TEU, Art 49. 
111 The process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced is measured by ‘Voice and 
Accountability’ and ‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism;’ the capacity of a 
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some are amongst the most highly ranked in the world reaching almost 100% on some 
indicators,112 others are lagging behind.113  As for the EU law making process, the 
EU’s ‘democratic deficit,’ primarily on the basis of ‘unresponsiveness to democratic 
pressures’ and ‘executive dominance,’ is a well-rehearsed theme in the academic 
literature, although given the counterfactual of decision making in the absence of EU 
institutions it is perhaps somewhat overstated.114 More worrying are the findings of 
Transparency International EU: the opacity in EU law-making, the undue influence of 
lobbyists with a significant ‘revolving door phenomenon’ and the resulting unequal 
access to decision-makers,115 as well as badly managed conflicts of interest, pose a 
significant risk for the integrity of decision-making by EU institutions.116 On that 
basis, we can tentatively conclude that the input legitimacy of the system setup is not 
without deficiencies.        
 
2) Input Legitimacy II: System Design 
 
Here the question is whether the institutional architecture of the system and its 
components is structured in a way that ensures the input legitimacy of system results.  
 
Corporate insolvency law as applied to financial institutions shows great diversity, 
ranging from standard court-centered judicial proceedings at one end of the spectrum 
to purely administrative procedures with regulators in the driving seat at the other, 
and various hybrid systems in between.117 Where financial institutions are subject to 
general insolvency law, certain modifications are usually in place, conferring a major 
                                                                                                                                                              
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policy is assessed on the basis of 
‘Government Effectiveness’ and ‘Regulatory Quality;’ Daniel Kaufmanm, Aart Kraay & Massimo 
Mastruzzi, The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues, 3 HAGUE 
JOURNAL ON THE RULE OF LAW 220, 223 (2011). 
112 e.g. on ‘Voice and Accountability’ in 2017: Sweden, 99.51%, Finland 97.54%, The Netherlands 
99.1%; http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports. 
113 e.g. on ‘Political Stability and absence of Violence/Terrorism’ in 2017: Bulgaria 60.48%; Greece 
40.95%; Romania 49.05%; http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports. 
114 PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS (6th edn 2017) 150-
155. 
115 Senior EU decision-makers frequently move directly into positions where they seek to influence 
former colleagues or their staff or join organizations they have previously regulated; TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL EU, ACCESS ALL AREAS – WHEN EU POLITICIANS BECOME LOBBYISTS, 7 (2017); 
https://transparency.eu/access-all-areas/.   
116 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL EU OFFICE, THE EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRITY SYSTEM 8 (2014); 
https://transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/EU_Integrity_System_Report.pdf. 
117 Binder et al, supra note 12.  
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role on the competent supervisory authority. For example, under German law, only 
the Federal Authority for Financial Market Supervision (BaFin) can petition the court 
for the opening of insolvency proceedings. The management’s duty to file for 
insolvency is transformed into a duty to give notice to BaFin.118 The court is not 
bound by the BaFin’s petition and will order the opening of proceedings only if the 
court is satisfied that there is a ground for opening proceedings.119 With the opening 
of proceedings, the office holder replaces the management and obtains comprehensive 
powers to dispose of the assets with a view to maximizing returns for creditors. BaFin 
is likely to revoke the banking license.120 Spanish insolvency law is similarly 
structured, albeit with a much reduced role of the competent authority;121 whereas 
Italian law provides for a financial institution specific liquidation procedure of an 
administrative nature firmly in the grasp of Banca d’Italia and the Ministry of 
Finance.122  
 
The BRRD/SRM resolution regime is an administrative procedure with initially123 no 
court involvement. The process is dominated by competent and resolution authorities. 
The resolution authority determines, either upon a communication from the competent 
authority or on its own motion, whether the institution meets the conditions for 
resolution and decides whether and in what form to take resolution action.124 
Following the initiation of resolution proceedings, the resolution authority can take 
                                                        
118 KWG, §46b. 
119 InsO §16. The general grounds for opening proceedings are the debtor’s inability to pay its debts as 
they fall due (cash flow insolvency; KWG, §46b(1); InsO §17(1)), as well as an excess of liabilities 
over assets (insolvency on a balance sheet basis; KWG, §46b(1); InsO §19(1)). Prospective cash flow 
insolvency provides a further ground. However, BaFin may petition the court on that basis only with 
the consent of the debtor’s management. 
120 KWG, §35(2) No4. 
121 Spanish insolvency law is briefly explained in Decision of the Single Resolution Board in its 
Executive Session of 7 June 2017 concerning the adoption of a resolution scheme in respect of Banco 
Popular Español, S.A, (the “Institution”) with a Legal Entity Identifier: 80H66LPTVDLM0P28XF25, 
Addressed to FROB (SRB/EES/2017/08) para 9-18; see also Binder et al, supra note 12, at 31-35. 
122 On the Compulsory Administrative Liquidation procedure under Italian law: Decision of the Single 
Resolution Board in its Executive Session of 23 June 2017 concerning the assessment of the conditions 
for resolution in respect of Veneto Banca S.p.A. (the “Institution”) with a Legal Entity Identifier 
549300W9STRUCJ2DLU64, addressed to Banca d’Italia in its capacity as National Resolution 
Authority (SRB/EES/2017/11) para 8-18; Decision of the Single Resolution Board in its Executive 
Session of 23 June 2017 concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Banca 
Popplare di Vicenza S.p.A. (the “Institution”) with a Legal Entity Identifier 
V3AFM0G2D3A6E0QWDG59, addressed to Banca d’Italia in its capacity as National Resolution 
Authority (SRB/EES/2017/12) para 8-18. 
123 On judicial review see SCHILLIG, supra note 43, Chapter 5. 
124 BRRD, Art 82. 
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control of an institution, directly or indirectly,125 so as to operate it with all the powers 
of the shareholders and the board of directors and to manage and dispose of its assets. 
Under the SRM, following a determination that an institution is failing by ECB126 or 
SRB, 127 the SRB assesses whether the conditions for resolutions are met, in particular 
whether there is no feasible private sector alternative128 and whether resolution is 
necessary in the public interest.129 If so, the SRB adopts a resolution scheme that 
places the institution under resolution, determines the application of resolution tools 
and powers and the use of the Single Resolution Fund.130 The latter is subject to a 
prior decision by the Commission confirming that the use of the Fund (or the granting 
of State aid) is compatible with the internal market and the Treaty provisions on State 
aid.131 The resolution scheme will enter into force only if within 24 hours of its 
transmission by the SRB to the Commission neither Commission nor Council 
object.132 On the basis of the resolution scheme, the SRB ensures that national 
resolution authorities take the necessary action under national law transposing the 
BRRD in order to implement the decision of the SRB.133  
 
The State aid procedure is governed primarily by Article 108 TFEU and the 
Procedural Regulation.134 Responsibility for the enforcement of the State aid regime 
                                                        
125 Through an appointed administrator (BRRD, Art 72) or a ‘special manager’ (BRRD, Art 35). 
126 The ECB decides within its Supervisory Board, composed of a Chair and Vice Chair, four ECB 
representatives and one representative of national central banks of Euro-zone Member States, giving 
national representatives a majority; see Danny Busch, Mirik B.J. van Rijn and Marije Louisse, How 
Single is the Single Resolution Mechanism? EBI WORKING PAPER SERIES 2019 - NO 30 13 (2019) 
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3309189). 
127 The SRB can make a determination that an institution is failing or likely to fail only after having 
previously informed the ECB of its intention and only if the ECB does not make such a determination 
within 3 calendar days following receipt of the SRB’s notice of intention. 
128 This assessment is to be made by the SRB in close cooperation with the ECB. 
129 SRMR, Art 18(1). 
130 SRMR, Art 18(6). 
131 SRMR, Art 19(1) and (3). 
132 Within 12 hours of transmission, the Commission may propose to the Council to either object to the 
scheme on the basis that the public interest requirement has not been met, or to approve (or reject) a 
material modification of the amount to be provided by the Single Resolution Fund. Where the Council 
objects on public interest grounds the entity is to be wound up under national insolvency law. Where, 
within 24 hours of transmission, the Council approves the proposed modification in respect of the use 
of the Fund, or the Commission objects to the scheme on the basis of its remaining discretionary 
aspects, the SRB has to modify the resolution scheme within 8 hours in accordance with the reasons 
expressed by Council or Commission; SRMR, Art 18(7)-(9). 
133 SRM Regulation, Art 18(9), 29. 
134 Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ EC 27.3.1999 L83/1; amended by Council Regulation 
(EU) No 734/2013 of 22 July 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules 
for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ EU 31.7.2013 L204/16. 
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rests exclusively with the Commission, in cooperation with the aid granting Member 
State. Under the SRM, the procedure is replicated so as to bring the SRB to the 
table.135 The procedural regime for new aid136 consists of a preliminary 
examination137 and, depending on its outcome, a formal investigation procedure.138 
The preliminary examination procedure is conceptualized as a dialogue between the 
Commission and the respective Member State. It begins with the notification by the 
Member State of a proposed aid measure to the Commission139 and imposes on the 
Member State a ‘standstill’ obligation prohibiting the granting of aid for the duration 
of the preliminary examination, and, where initiated, also for the duration of the 
formal investigation procedure, until a final decision is reached.140 Following 
notification, the Commission considers the measure and may come to the conclusion 
that the measure is not ‘aid’; it is ‘aid’ but compatible with the Treaty; or it is ‘aid’ 
and the Commission encounters ‘serious difficulties’ in its assessment of the aid’s 
compatibility with the Treaty. In the latter case the Commission launches the formal 
investigation procedure141 by giving notice to the parties concerned, essentially the 
Member State and the beneficiaries of the proposed aid measure, in order to receive 
their comments.142 As a result of the formal investigation, the Commission may 
authorize the measure;143 possibly subject to certain conditions; or may decide that the 
aid may not be granted.144 The Banking Communication has modified this general 
framework in important respects. For restructuring aid145 in the form of a 
recapitalization or impaired asset measure, Member States are invited to enter into 
voluntary pre-notification contacts with the Commission. In particular, Commission 
                                                        
135 SRMR, Art 19. Otherwise, obligations to notify the Commission of aid measures would only apply 
to Member States, and not the SRB as an EU agency. 
136 In addition to aid yet to be granted, this concept includes the alteration of existing aid; Procedural 
Regulation, Art 1(c). Existing aid includes aid in existence when the Member State joined the Union 
and aid legally implemented in accordance with the Treaty; Procedural Regulation, Art 1(b). 
137 Art 108(3) TFEU. 
138 Art 108(2) TFEU. 
139 Art 108(3) TFEU, Procedural Regulation, Art 2. 
140 Art 108(3) TFEU, Procedural Regulation, Art 3. 
141 Procedural Regulation, Art 4. 
142 Third parties in the form of other Member States, competitor firms and trade associations may be 
invited to comment; Art 108(2) TFEU, Procedural Regulation, Art 6. 
143 Because it is not ‘aid’ or it is ‘aid’ compatible with the Treaty. 
144 Procedural Regulation, Art 7. 
145 ‘Restructuring aid’ involves ‘more permanent assistance and must restore the long-term viability of 
the beneficiary on the basis of a feasible, coherent and far-reaching restructuring plan, while at the 
same time allowing for adequate own contribution and burden sharing and limiting the potential 
distortions of competition’; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION: 
GUIDELINES ON STATE AID FOR RESCUING AND RESTRUCTURING NON-FINANCIAL UNDERTAKINGS IN 
DIFFICULTY, OJ EU 31.7.2014 C249/1 (R&R GUIDELINES), para 27.  
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and Member State may discuss a restructuring plan and once agreement has been 
reached, the Member State may formally notify it. Agreement on the restructuring 
plan is a necessary precondition for the authorization of recapitalization or impaired 
asset measures.146 Exceptionally the Commission may authorize these measures on a 
temporary basis as rescue aid147 before a restructuring plan has been approved where 
this is necessary for preserving financial stability.148 Throughout the process, the 
Commission has to liaise closely with supervisory authorities so as to ensure a smooth 
interplay between the different roles and responsibilities of all authorities involved.149 
Thus, for the financial sector, State aid control is essentially a four-way negotiation 
between the Commission, the relevant Member State’s government, the relevant 
supervisory authorities, and the beneficiary institution. This remains relevant in 
particular for those situations where State aid may be granted outside the BRRD/SRM 
resolution framework.      
 
The assessment of the institutional architecture of domestic standard insolvency law 
requires an analysis of the workings of the insolvency court systems in the various 
Member States, including procedural arrangements, court independence, appointment 
of judges and legal education. For financial institution insolvency processes, the 
independence, expertise and professional integrity of national competent authorities is 
of equal importance. The same is true for national resolution authorities under the 
framework of the BRRD and when implementing resolution schemes issued by the 
SRB. The World Bank’s ‘Rule of Law’ Worldwide Governance Indicator150 paints a 
mixed picture with many Member States scoring very highly,151 whereas others show 
significant shortcomings.152 The same is true for the ‘Control of Corruption’ 
                                                        
146 BANKING COMMUNICATION, supra note 57, at para 34. 
147 ‘Rescue aid’ is of an urgent and temporary nature with the primary objective of keeping an 
undertaking afloat for the short time needed to work out a restructuring or liquidation plan; R&R 
Guidelines, supra note 145, para 26. 
148 BANKING COMMUNICATION, supra note 57, at para 50. The same applies to State guarantees and 
liquidity support (other than through central banks), although here a threat to financial stability is not a 
precondition for a temporary approval; id. para 56. 
149 Id. para 14. 
150 This indicator seeks to capture ‘perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence;’ Kaufmanm, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 
supra note 111, at 223. 
151 e.g. for 2017: Austria 96.2%; Denmark 97.6%; Finland 100%. 
152 e.g. for 2017: Bulgaria 51.9%; Greece 56.7%; Romania 63.9%. 
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indicator.153 Of the EU institutions involved in the SRM resolution framework (SRB, 
ECB, Commission and Council) and the State aid regime, only the SRB has not yet 
been subject to scrutiny by Transparency International, although its transparency 
policy has been found wanting by the Appeal Panel in the course of the resolution of 
Spanish banking group Banco Popular;154 with the Appeal Panel’s decision currently 
being subject to judicial review.155 For Commission and Council the opacity of 
decision making, the susceptibility to the influence of lobbyists, inadequate 
mechanisms for dealing with conflicts of interest and the ‘revolving door’ problem 
have already been identified.156 A recent report on the integrity of the ECB has found, 
in addition to a need to improve the management of conflicts of interest, that the 
revolving door phenomenon is particularly problematic.157 Overall, the ECB’s 
accountability framework has been found to be lacking given its far-reaching 
responsibilities in the economic governance of the Euro-zone.158 A further concern is 
that EU institutions and national authorities rely on a small number of auccounting 
firms and financial advisory firms when designing rescue packages. The involvement 
of the same firms as consultants and auditors of failing institutions can result in 
massive conflicts of interest. Moreover, even poor or inaccurate advice resulting in 
significant losses for the taxpayer has few, if any consequence, with new contracts 
being awarded despite repeated failures in the past.159  
    
3) Output Legitimacy I: System Elements 
 
                                                        
153 It seeks to capture ‘perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private 
interests;’ Kaufmanm, Kraay & Mastruzzi, supra note 111, at 223. For 2017: Denmark 98.6%; Finland 
99%; Luxembourg 96.2% and Bulgaria 51%; Greece 52.4%; Italy 61.5%. 
154 see https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/442. 
155 Case T-62/18 Aeris Invest v SRB (pending). 
156 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL EU OFFICE, supra note 116. 
157 Members of the Executive Board have frequently moved on to posts in private finance, even though 
none of them had significant professional experience in the private financial sector prior to their ECB 
appointment. 
158 BENJAMIN BRAUN, TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN? INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE 
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, REPORT FOR TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL EU 5 (2017); 
https://transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/TI-EU_ECB_Report_DIGITAL.pdf. 
159 SOL TRUMBO VILA AND MATTHIJS PETERS, THE BAIL OUT BUSINESS: WHO PROFITS FROM BANK 
RESCUES IN THE EU? 4 (2017); https://www.tni.org/files/publication-
downloads/tni_bail_out_eng_online0317.pdf. For example, in 2011, Bankia reported profits of over 
EUR300m duly audited by Deloitte. When Bankia had to be nationalized less than a year later it turned 
out that it had actually lost EUR4.3bn. The Bank of Spain declared Deloitte’s audit reports for Bankia 
invalid due to grave irregularities: at least 12 clear errors in Bankia’s financial statements had been 
overlooked by Deloitte; id at 10-11. 
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Normative system analysis assesses a system’s results against the goals that have been 
attributed to the system as desirable.160 The system elements are themselves 
subsystems with their own (normative) goals attributed to them.161 Thus, output 
legitimacy can be assessed, first, in respect of the results achieved by the system 
elements: corporate insolvency law, the BRRD/SRM resolution framework and the 
State aid regime. For each system element we need to identify the goal attributed to it 
and the problem(s) it is designed to solve, and establish whether the subsystem has the 
capacity of attaining the envisaged objective (at reasonable social cost).162   
 
In the absence of a clear statutory stipulation,163 the identification of the goal that 
corporate insolvency law when applied to financial institutions should seek to achieve 
is marred with difficulties. Not only may there be significant divergence across 
jurisdictions, even within one and the same legal system various procedures may be 
geared towards the attainment of different objectives.164 As a general tendency in 
European national insolvency legislation over the last 30 years, there has been a shift 
in emphasis from insolvency law being almost exclusively geared towards protecting 
the creditors’ property rights with a view to maximizing asset values165 towards the 
more inclusive goal of rehabilitating and continuing the debtor’s business as a going 
concern, thus also benefitting stakeholders, other than creditors, notably employees 
and the wider community. This trend is neatly encapsulated in the often-invoked 
notion of ‘rescue culture.’166 Where corporate insolvency law is deployed, perhaps in 
modified form, for dealing with distressed financial institutions, the stabilization of 
the financial system is likely to be of at least equal if not overriding importance.167 In 
                                                        
160 LoPucki, supra note 27, at 486. Positive analysis equates the goals of the system with the results 
that the system actually produces; id. 
161 Id. at 487. 
162 Börzel & Panke, supra note 66, at 157; SCHARPF, supra note 71, at 11. 
163 Binder et al, supra note 12, at 12; see for example German insolvency law, InsO §1: ‘The 
insolvency process has the objective of collectively satisfying the creditors by realizing the debtor’s 
assets and distributing the proceeds, or by adopting an alternative solution pursuant to a restructuring 
plan in particular with a view to rescuing the business as a going concern.’   
164 Horst Eidenmüller, Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe, eds) 1003, 1006-1015 
(2016). 
165 On Spanish insolvency law: Decision of the Single Resolution Board, supra note 121, para 11. 
166 EUROPEAN LAW INSTITUTE, INSTRUMENT OF THE EUROPEAN LAW INSTITUTE: RESCUE OF BUSINESS 
IN INSOLVENCY LAW 103 (2017); 
https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/Publications/Instrument_INSOLVE
NCY.pdf. 
167 For Germany, KredReorgG, §1(1): ‘The rehabilitation and reorganization procedures aim to 
stabilize financial markets through the rehabilitation or reorganization of credit institutions …’. 
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order to prevent a run on the debtor’s assets, with the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings a more or less comprehensive moratorium will normally come into 
effect.168 Certain qualified financial contracts of systemic importance – derivatives, 
repos, stock lending – may be exempt. Insolvency proceedings normally entail the 
appointment of an office holder to at least supervise the management of the debtor’s 
business, whereby the court itself or an administrative authority may fulfill this role. 
Legal systems may differ in their general policy preference in terms of restructuring 
or liquidation of a failing institution, although perhaps ideally the outcome should 
depend on the circumstances in every individual case.169 Where the business is no 
longer viable, liquidation will be the only option. Here insolvency law provides a 
mechanism that ensures the realization of the company’s assets at maximum value. 
The proceeds must be fairly and equitably distributed amongst the different classes of 
creditors in accordance with a statutory order of priority under which the ranking of 
various creditors is clear from an ex ante perspective. However, there seems to be no 
good reason as to why in appropriate circumstances national corporate insolvency law 
may not be utilized for preserving a failing institution as a going concern. In the past, 
banks such as Barings and Chancery Plc have been successfully restructured on the 
basis of the English law administration procedure. The application of this ‘rescue 
culture’ requires, here and in general, a corporate insolvency law that enables a 
distressed firm to acquire a new capital structure.170 This can be achieved in two 
principal ways: First, the business remains with the debtor company and the latter’s 
debt load is reduced, by writing down or rescheduling liabilities and/or converting 
debt to equity. Here, corporate insolvency law provides a negotiation process 
facilitated by information rights, majority voting in classes and possibly cross-class 
cramdown provisions. Alternatively, the business (assets and certain liabilities) may 
be transferred (sold) to a new entity with a more sustainable capital structure, leaving 
some of the existing creditors behind with an empty shell.171 This requires extensive 
powers of the office holder to dispose of the debtor’s assets, combined with the legal 
                                                        
168 Creditors are no longer able to exercise their individual enforcement rights; judicial proceedings 
come to a hold. Even secured creditors may be prevented from enforcing their security interests. 
169 Binder et al, supra note 12, at 12. 
170 BARRY R. ADLER, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD AND THOMAS H. JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY: CASES, PROBLEMS, 
AND MATERIALS 26 (4th edn. 2007). 
171 On the Italian bank specific Compulsory Administrative Liquidation procedure: Decision of the 
Single Resolution Board (Veneto Banca), supra note 122, at para 15; Decision of the Single Resolution 
Board (Banca Popplare di Vicenza), supra note 122, at para 15. 
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recognition of arrangements that determine seniority amongst creditors and facilitate 
the release of security. In practice, both approaches will often be combined to a 
greater or lesser extent.172 It is difficult to evaluate the goal attainment capacity of the 
various domestic insolvency law systems, in particular when applied to financial 
institutions. Resolution of financial institutions through insolvency law is a rare event, 
and many of the newer procedures remain untested. Empirical material is scarce. The 
‘distributing administration’ of Lehman Brothers International Europe, Lehman’s 
main trading company in Europe, and of other Lehman entities is still ongoing 10 
years after commencement. The World Bank’s Doing Business report on Resolving 
Insolvency may only provide a rough indicator.173 However, given the complexity 
involved in the resolution of a financial institution through insolvency it is unlikely 
that a lowly ranked jurisdiction174 would do significantly better in the financial 
institution context; and higher ranked jurisdictions175 may do significantly worse. 
 
The meta-objective of the BRRD/SRM resolution framework is spelled out in Recital 
(1) of the BRRD: 
‘The financial crisis has shown that there is a significant lack of adequate tools 
at Union level to deal effectively with unsound or failing credit institutions 
and investment firms (…). Such tools are needed, in particular to prevent 
insolvency or, when insolvency occurs, to minimize negative repercussions by 
preserving the systemically important functions of the institution concerned. 
During the crisis, those challenges were a major factor that forced Member 
States to save institutions using taxpayers’ money. The objective of a credible 
recovery and resolution framework is to obviate the need for such action to the 
greatest extent possible.’     
Rightly or wrongly, standard insolvency law proceedings are deemed to be inadequate 
for dealing with systemic financial institutions in distress: they are perceived as being 
too slow, unable to ensure the continuity of critical functions, and resulting in the 
destruction of value with a negative impact on the real economy; thus, overall 
                                                        
172  For non-financials, see KON ASIMACOPOULOS & JUSTIN BICKLE (eds.), EUROPEAN DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING HANDBOOK: LEADING CASE STUDIES FROM THE POST-LEHMAN CYCLE (2013). 
173 The assessment does not look at financial institution insolvency at all (the model is based on a small 
hotel business); http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency. 
174 Malta: 121; Luxembourg: 90; and even France only makes it to 28. 
175 Finland: 2; Germany: 4; Denmark: 6; Netherlands: 7; Slovenia: 9. 
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insufficiently geared towards the preservation of financial stability.176 The 
BRRD/SRM resolution framework seeks to simulate the loss allocation principles of 
general insolvency law, thereby retaining the incentive structure for investors and 
management with a view to restoring market discipline; whilst at the same time 
providing a tailored administrative procedure aimed at avoiding the systemic 
implications of standard insolvency law in form of contagious knock-on effects for 
other market participants, financial market infrastructures and the real economy.177 
The general concern in corporate insolvency law for maximizing asset values and 
balancing stakeholder interests is partly superseded by public policy considerations in 
the interest of financial stability which are invoked to override certain basic 
assumptions and limitations of standard corporate insolvency law.178 Consequently, 
when applying resolution tools and powers resolution authorities must seek to achieve 
one or more of the ‘resolution objectives:’ (i) to ensure the continuity of critical 
functions; (ii) to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, including by 
preventing contagion and maintaining market discipline; (iii) to protect public funds 
by minimizing reliance on extraordinary public financial support; (iv) to protect 
depositors as well as client funds and assets; and (v) to minimize the cost of resolution 
and avoid the unnecessary destruction of value.179 These resolution objectives also 
inform the public interest requirement as one element of the resolution trigger. Thus, 
where the competent authority or the resolution authority determines that an 
institutions is failing or likely to fail – due to a breach of minimum capital 
requirements, illiquidity, insolvency or a need for extraordinary public financial 
support – and the resolution authority further determines that there is no other 
alternative for preventing failure, and that resolution is in the public interest, the 
institution will be subject to resolution proceedings under which the resolution 
authority has a range of far reaching resolution tools and powers at its disposal. The 
transfer tools allow the resolution authority to transfer the shares of an institution 
under resolution, or all or some of its assets, rights or liabilities to a private sector 
                                                        
176 Karl-Philipp Wojcik, Bail-In In The Banking Union, 53 C.M.L. REV. 91, 92 (2016). 
177 Id. at 126; Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 6, at 232-234; Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 30, at 101; Jens-
Hinrich Binder, Proportionality at the resolution stage: Calibration of resolution measures and the 
public interest, 3 (July 3, 2017); https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2990379; Jens-
Hinrich Binder, Systemkrisenbewältigung durch Bankenabwicklung? Aktuelle Bemerkungen zu 
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179 BRRD, Art 31(2); SRMR, Art 14. 
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purchaser,180 a bridge institution181 or an asset management vehicle.182 Generally 
applicable corporate and securities law is suspended and the consent of the 
institution’s shareholders is not required. In addition, BRRD and SRM provide for a 
‘bail-in’ tool for eligible liabilities, on top of the power to write down or convert 
capital instruments. The bail-in tool entails the powers to write down eligible 
liabilities, to convert them into shares, and to cancel shares and debt securities. These 
powers may be used to either recapitalize an institution in order to restore its 
viability;183 or to reduce the amount of debt transferred from the institution under 
resolution to a bridge institution with a view to capitalizing it, or in the context of the 
sale of business tool or asset separation tool.184 In order to provide adequate funding 
for the application of resolution tools and powers, the BRRD establishes a European 
System of Financing Arrangements consisting of national financing arrangements, 
borrowing between national financing arrangements and the mutualisation of national 
financing arrangements in the case of a group resolution.185 Under the SRM a Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF) has been established, pooling resources from all Euro-area 
banks and serving as a Euro-area wide insurance mechanism.186   
 
To date, the BRRD/SRM resolution framework has been used only once in the case of 
Spanish banking group Banco Popular. The resolution entailed the application of the 
power to write down and convert capital instruments, in combination with the sale of 
business tool.187 With total assets of EUR147bn, Banco Popular was classified as a 
significant institution directly supervised by the ECB. The EBA stress test in 2016 
showed a CET1 ratio of 10.2% in the baseline scenario, and of 6.6% in the adverse 
scenario, so that the bank should have been able to sustain a severe shock, although 
competing measures of the bank’s risk exposure released by NYU and the IMF 
showed serious shortages of capital.188 The disclosure of extraordinary provisions, the 
appointment of a new CEO, the announcement of a capital increase without any 
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187 Decision of the Single Resolution Board, supra note 121.     
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keep them in Play, 18 (Sept. 15, 2017); https://ssrn.com/abstract=3038510: questioning the credibility 
of the EBA stress-test results which seem to have the main purpose of giving citizens false comfort. 
 32 
specifics, and the resulting downgrades lead to the initiation of a private sales process, 
and an acceleration of deposit withdrawals from business customers. Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance of EUR3.6bn granted by the Bank of Spain was used up within 
two days, allowing sophisticated creditors to exit on time without sustaining any 
losses.189 Following consultation with the SRB, the ECB determined that the bank 
was failing or likely to fail.190 The SRB determined that no equally effective private 
sector or regulatory measures were available: the private sales process had failed; 
early intervention was unlikely to be successful; and a write down and conversion of 
capital instruments in isolation was unlikely to be sufficient. Resolution was deemed 
to be in the public interest in order to ensure the continuity of critical functions191 and 
to protect financial stability.192 Having received one binding offer as a result of the 
marketing process, the SRB adopted a resolution scheme on 7 June 2017, which was 
endorsed by the Commission. A provisional valuation carried out by Deloitte 
established a net asset value of EUR -2bn in the baseline, and of EUR -8.2bn in the 
adverse scenario. An earlier PWC audit of April 2016 had established a net asset 
value of EUR10.8bn,193 just over a year before. The resolution scheme entailed in a 
first step the write down and conversion of capital instruments: 4bn ordinary shares 
with a par value of EUR0.50, amounting to a share capital of EUR2bn, were written 
down and canceled to 100%; various Additional Tier 1 instruments were first 
converted at par value into newly issued shares resulting in 1.35bn of EUR1 par value 
shares, the New Shares I, which were subsequently written down and canceled to 
100%; thereafter, various Tier 2 instruments were converted at par into newly issued 
shares resulting in 684m of EUR1 par value shares, the New Shares II. In exercise of 
the sale of business tool, all New Shares II were transferred to Banco Santander for 
EUR1. 
 
                                                        
189 Id; see also, although unrelated to the Banco Popular case, Tucker, supra note 31, 544: ‘[I]t is quite 
simply wrong for a politically insulated authority knowingly to lend, even on a secured basis, to a firm 
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190 Due to a significantly deteriorating liquidity situation the bank would be unable to pay its debts or 
other liabilities in the near future. 
191 Deposits of households, SMEs and larger corporates; SME lending; and payment and cash services. 
192 Banco Popular was Spain’s sixth largest banking group with total assets that rendered the group 
significant and of a systemic nature. Moreover, there was a risk of contagion if liquidated under normal 
insolvency law procedures. 
193 Thomas Hale, Robert Smith & Martin Arnold, Banco Popular’s failure leaves questions 
unanswered, FT, July 4, 2017. 
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The Banco Popular resolution has been celebrated as an exemplary application of the 
new resolution framework, demonstrating that a systemically significant institution 
can be resolved with minimal market disruption and without any taxpayer 
contribution.194 However, certain features of the process suggest that some caution 
may be in order. It is somewhat peculiar that the preliminary valuation established a 
net asset value of the firm that was almost to the cent equal to the aggregate of 
Additional Tier1 and Tier2 instruments. It was only because of this coincidence that 
the potentially much more disruptive bail-in of junior or even senior bond holders and 
the injection of resolution fund money could be avoided.195 In this sense, Banco 
Popular was an ‘easy case.’ As an interesting aside, Deloitte who carried out the 
preliminary valuation had been found guilty of malpractice and fined to the tune of 
EUR12m for their auditing of the accounts of another failed Spanish bank.196 In the 
context of Deloitte’s submission of the final valuation report for ‘no-creditor-worse-
off’ purposes it has been remarked that Deloitte was allowed ‘to mark its own 
homework,’ putting the credibility of the final valuation in doubt.197 Moreover, as a 
result of the transaction, Spain’s largest bank, Banco Santander, has become even 
bigger which does seem to run counter to the reform rationale of tackling the ‘too-big-
to-fail’ problem. As Kane has pointed out, it is very likely that Santander has received 
tacit assurances of contingent loss absorption in the form of guarantees or options to 
put any non-performing loans back to the Spanish government,198 thus concealing the 
true nature and cost of the transaction as a (partial) bailout.199 Overall, the 
BRRD/SRM transfer tools are time-honored resolution mechanisms that have been 
successfully used in other jurisdictions, notably in FDIC receiverships for depository 
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institutions. It remains to be seen whether these tools can be equally effectively 
applied in respect of large and complex financial institutions. Effective application 
may be thwarted by time constraints and sheer complexity.200 Transfers may not be 
effective for assets, rights and liabilities governed by foreign law. Finding an 
adequate buyer is much easier for a small or medium sized bank in a competitive 
banking market with a multitude of smaller institutions. It will be much more difficult 
for a large and complex banking group. Unless, the failing institution is liquidated on 
a piecemeal basis, only other large institutions will likely be able to take on parts of 
the business in resolution, thus exacerbating the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem. The bail-in 
tool remains largely untested and its goal attainment capacity controversial. The bail-
in of deposits at two Cypriot banks occurred prior to the taking effect of the BRRD 
and affected predominantly non-EU depositors. Whilst recognizing bail-in’s inherent 
risk of contagion, believers expect that the prices of debt will more accurately reflect 
the risk of an investment in a bank, thereby strengthening market discipline and 
reducing the likelihood of a systemic crisis.201 Skeptics point to the complexities 
inherent in the bail-in process with its multiple discretionary junctures, ambiguities, 
and inter-agency coordination and cooperation requirements which in combination are 
likely to render the adequate pricing of bail-inable debt near impossible.202 The 
emerging consensus seems to be that bail-in may be effective when it comes to the 
resolution of smaller non-systemic domestic banks, but counterproductive during a 
systemic crisis.203 This is somewhat ironic given that the BRRD/SRM mechanisms 
were devised specifically for the resolution of institutions the failure of which would 
likely constitute a systemic event.204         
     
Initially, the goal of State aid control was deemed to be the removal of discriminatory 
measures between Member States. The granting of State aid to domestic firms would 
put undertakings from other Member States at a disadvantage similar to national 
regulatory restrictions to free movement. State aid control was viewed as a tool for 
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removing these restrictions, and thus as an essential element of the internal market 
and its free movement rationale.205 Subsequently, as the internal market and free 
movement gradually became a reality, the State aid regime was seen as more akin to 
the rules on competition law with the aim of preventing distortions of competition 
between undertakings – foreign and domestic – rather than between Member States. 
The State aid rules no longer exclusively targeted obstacles to trade between Member 
States, but were increasingly applied to ensure the proper functioning of the internal 
market by preventing distortions within individual national markets.206 Rather than 
drawing a clear dividing lean between both approaches, the rationale for State aid 
control may perhaps best be viewed as a dynamic concept that has evolved in 
accordance with the economic and political realities of the Union.207 The hybrid 
nature of the State aid regime seems to have been implicitly endorsed in Philip Morris 
where, despite an invitation by the applicant to rule on the substance of the State aid 
rules, the Court remained essentially silent.208 The broad discretion that the 
Commission enjoys under the State aid regime allows it to pursue policy objectives 
other than undistorted competition and free movement. These secondary policy 
objectives may potentially conflict with the primary rationales of competition and free 
movement in which case the application of State aid control becomes a balancing 
exercise. Where pursuance of secondary objectives is likely to enhance undistorted 
competition, the State aid framework may allow the Commission to pursue a specific 
industrial policy under the cover of the competition and internal market rationales. 
Both scenarios can be observed in the context of financial institution bailouts. Under 
the Banking Communications, ‘financial stability has been the overarching objective’ 
for the Commission.209 At the same time, the Commission aims at ‘ensuring that State 
aid and distortions of competition between banks and across Member States are kept 
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to a minimum.’210 In an acute crisis, financial stability concerns will usually be 
invoked to justify comprehensive bailouts in order to prevent contagion. Accordingly, 
at the beginning of the global financial crisis, the balance was tilted heavily towards 
financial stability with the Commission approving aid measures very generously. As 
crisis-State aid practice moved through its various phases, the Commission 
increasingly insisted on the implementation of compensatory measures that would 
offset distortions of competition resulting from State aid.211 Depending on the type of 
aid measures212, nuanced compatibility criteria apply. State aid must be limited to the 
minimum amount necessary and the Member State must demonstrate that all 
measures to limit state aid have been exhausted.213 Adequate burden sharing requires, 
in principle, a contribution to loss absorption by equity, the holders of hybrid capital 
instruments and of subordinated debt; not, however, of senior (unsecured) debt 
holders.214 If following the implementation of capital raising measures and burden 
sharing a capital shortfall remains, it may be covered through state aid on the basis of 
a restructuring plan to be assessed on the basis of the Restructuring 
Communication.215 The necessary measures to limit distortions of competition vary 
depending on the degree of burden sharing: the greater the burden sharing and the 
bank’s own contribution, the less need for offsetting measures.216 Distortions of 
competition may be addressed, in addition to the adequate remuneration of any State 
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intervention,217 through structural measures218 and/or behavioral measures.219 On the 
assumption that a financial system consisting of smaller, less complex and actively 
competing banks is more stable and less prone to financial crisis, the pursuit of long 
term financial stability seems to coincide with the undistorted competition rationale. 
This would seem to allow the Commission to pursue a quasi-industrial policy through 
State aid control, forcing structural change. As expressed by Commissioner Almunia 
in 2012: ‘we want a leaner, cleaner and healthier banking system centered on the 
financing of the real economy.’220 On the basis of its State aid practice during the 
crisis, the Commission has been widely credited with preventing a banking meltdown 
whilst at the same time avoiding significant distortions of competition in the internal 
market.221 However, it is questionable whether the State aid control mandate was 
robust enough to force structural change within the banking sector.222  
 
4) Output Legitimacy II: System Output 
 
The system output has to be measured against the goals attributed to the system 
overall. Where the actual system output falls short, the system’s behavior may be 
addressed by either modifying the behavior of the system elements or their 
interactions. 
 
The Group of 20 (G20) has called repeatedly for an effective system of resolution 
tools and powers to restructure or resolve all types of financial institutions in crisis 
without having to rely ultimately on taxpayers’ money.223 According to the FSB’s 
Key Attributes, ‘[t]he objective of an effective resolution regime is to make feasible 
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the resolution of financial institutions … without exposing taxpayers to loss.’224 Thus, 
the overall system goal, as mandated by international standard setters, is the limitation 
of taxpayer-funded bailouts to a minimum. Given that certain bailouts are inevitable, 
the system objective becomes operational when defined as limiting bailouts to those 
that are ‘good,’ because they are in the public interest. The ‘pie-enlarging’ effect of a 
bailout is an indication that it is in the public interest, as opposed to being merely re-
distributive.225 
 
A bailout will be ‘pie-increasing’ to the extent that its social benefits exceed its social 
costs. Although easily formulated, this standard is difficult to apply to a concrete 
bailout or bailout framework, both ex post and even more so ex ante. Still 
comparatively easy is the juxtaposition of government money outflows in form of 
loans and recapitalization, and risk exposure under guarantee schemes, and the 
subsequent inflows through loan repayment, the sale of capital instruments and 
guarantee fees. As of February 2019, the total outflows under the US bailout measures 
amounted to $632.4bn, the total inflows to $739.7bn, generating a profit for the 
taxpayer of $107.3bn.226 For the EU, the picture is less rosy. Between 2008 and 2016, 
EUR 5 trillion have been approved as State aid for the rescue of ailing banks; of 
which EUR2 trillion have been used up.227 As of October 2016, an amount of EUR 
213bn of taxpayers’ money – equal to the GDP of Finland and Luxembourg combined 
– has been irrecoverably lost.228 Even these relatively straightforward figures are 
fraught with uncertainty. In the absence of universally accepted guidelines, various 
governments and EU institutions rely on different methodologies for estimating and 
calculating bailout costs, which makes cross country comparison very difficult.229 
More importantly, in the same way that the social benefits of a bailout go far beyond 
the revenue received by the government – as proceeds of the selling of stakes in 
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bailed-out institutions or loan repayments with interest – the social costs reach far 
beyond the sums of immediate bailout money injected by the government.230           
   
a) The Social Benefits of Bailouts  
 
The (hidden) social benefits of a bailout may be thought of as equal to the costs to the 
government of nonintervention.231 The counterfactual nature of this assessment makes 
the determination of bailout benefits a highly speculative exercise.232 The statements 
of Timothy Geithner and Ben Barnanke before the House Committee on Financial 
Services on the AIG bailout233 may serve as an example of the widely accepted 
narrative: 
‘AIG’s failure would have caused catastrophic damage – damage in the form 
of sharply lower equity prices and pension values, higher interest rates, and a 
broader loss of confidence in the world’s major financial institutions. This 
would have intensified an already-deepening global recession, and we did not 
have the ability to contain the damage through other means.’234 
‘Global banks and investment banks would have suffered losses on loans and 
lines of credit to AIG and on derivatives with AIG FP.... Moreover, as the 
Lehman case clearly demonstrates, focusing on the direct effects of a default 
on AIG’s counterparties understates the risk to the financial system as a 
whole. Once begun, a financial crisis can spread unpredictably. ... Moreover, it 
was well-known in the market that many major financial institutions had large 
exposures to AIG. Its failure would likely have led financial market 
participants to pull back even more from commercial and investment banks, 
and those institutions perceived as weaker would have faced escalating 
pressure.’235 
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In these passages, ‘AIG’ could be replaced with the name of any major financial 
institution of global significance. The narrative is plausible, at least to some extent,236 
and almost impossible to disprove, although there is some empirical evidence 
suggesting that market reactions to the Lehman bankruptcy and the AIG bailout were 
very similar, indeed sometimes worse in the latter case.237 
 
Generally speaking, the costs of nonintervention and therefore the benefits of 
intervention are greater where nonintervention would imperil large parts of the 
domestic and potentially global financial system with significant macro-economic 
consequences: a loss in tax revenues, increasing unemployment and higher costs for 
unemployment benefits and other welfare programs, a reduction of economic output 
and productivity, and a possible explosion of government debt.238 This will more 
likely be the case where a failing institution is systemically important and occupies a 
central position within a domestic or the global financial system, by, for example, 
acting as counterparty for numerous other firms with large exposures or by supporting 
important sectors of the real economy.239 A multitude of smaller firms may reach a 
critical mass with their combined failure potentially having a macro-economic impact.           
 
b) The Social Costs of Bailouts 
 
It is tempting to equate the social costs of bailouts with the sums of money directly 
injected into failing institutions and markets. However, this does not account for 
significant amounts of hidden costs in the form of fees paid by governments and EU 
institutions to the Big Four accounting firms and a small number of financial 
consultancies.240 Another hidden cost frequently ignored is the increase in public debt 
and higher interest payments.241         
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The non-pecuniary social costs of bailouts are even more difficult to quantify. 
Conceptually, these costs are encapsulated in the so-called ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem. 
As the memory of the global financial crisis begins to fade,242 commentators have 
begun to argue that the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem is exaggerated.243 The ‘too-big-to-
fail’ problem may be broken down into three basic elements: (i) moral hazard on the 
part of a ‘too-big-to-fail’ firm; (ii) moral hazard on the part of investors who buy the 
financial assets issued by a ‘too-big-to-fail’ firm, usually referred to as lack of market 
discipline; and (iii) the exposure of taxpayers to losses on implicit and explicit 
government guarantees, loans and/or capital injections.244   
 
The moral hazard argument (i) goes as follows: when operating under an implicit state 
guarantee, an institution’s management and traders have an incentive to invest in 
highly volatile assets in order to achieve ever-higher returns for investors and ever-
higher compensation for themselves245 without having to fear adverse consequences 
from the materialization of downside tail-risks. The ensuing culture of short-termism 
and speculation renders the financial system more fragile overall. At a conceptual 
level, Steven Schwarcz has challenged this argument: Rather than being caused by 
bailout expectations, excessive risk taking was due to the prevalent shareholder 
primacy rule of corporate governance. In order to maximize shareholder value, a 
firm’s management must invest in any project with a positive net present value taking 
into account only the potential costs to the firm itself; any systemic harm will be 
externalized and born by other market participants and the general public, and should 
therefore not be considered by a shareholder value maximizing management.246 
However, theoretically shareholders are deemed, and empirically they are likely, to be 
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244 Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 6, at 226; Tröger, supra note 202, at 6; Wojcik, supra note 176, at 93; 
Dell’Ariccia et al, supra note 225, at 8. 
245 EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 113-115 (2012). 
246 Schwarcz, supra note 243, at 770. Consequently, seeking to address excessive risk taking by 
regulating ‘too-big-to-fail’ may be ‘inefficient, ineffective, and sometimes even dangerous;’ id. at 765-
784. 
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widely diversified.247 In a world of diversified investment portfolios, management can 
ignore systemic harm only to the extent that their firm is ‘too-big-to-fail’ and will be 
bailed out. Otherwise, firm failure, if truly systemic, will hit shareholders (and other 
investors) directly across their entire portfolio. Consequently, a shareholder wealth 
maximizing management should take systemic harms into account; only the prospect 
of a bailout eliminates systemic harm from the equation and allows excessive risk 
taking.248 Empirical research seems to confirm that the moral hazard problem remains 
valid.249      
 
According to the second element of the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem, the funding costs of 
‘too-big-to-fail’ institutions are publicly subsidized. Investors will benefit from higher 
returns given a certain level of risk. Market discipline breaks down because any 
potential losses for investors will not be borne by them, but by the taxpayer.250 It has 
been argued that the empirical evidence merely demonstrates that large, systemically 
important firms can borrow at lower than average cost, which may be due to reasons 
other than the expectations of a bailout, notably economies of scale, better access to 
capital markets, larger dividend pay-out ratios and less vulnerability to market 
disruptions.251 However, Bryan Kelly, Hanno Lustig and Stijn Van Nieuwerburger 
                                                        
247 Henry T.C. Hu & Jay L. Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUMBIA 
L. REV. 1321, 1360-1362 (2007). 
248 This can be demonstrated by modifying Schwarcz’s example for ‘calculating the expected value 
disparity;’ Schwarcz, supra note 243, at 797-799. With an 80% chance of a project succeeding and, in 
that case, a value accruing to investors of 50m, plus a loss of 20m should the project fail, the expected 
value of the project to investors is 36m (.8*50m + .2*-20m). If at the same time the value of the 
project’s success to society is negligible, and the project’s failure has a 10% chance of triggering the 
institution’s failure in which case it has to be bailed out with 500m, the expected value of the project to 
the public is -10m (0.8*0 +.2*.1*500m). However, this calculation only works if the institution’s 
bailout is priced in. Without it, expected value to investors would have to take into account their 
portfolio losses. Of course, everything depends on the assumed values. Schwarcz assumes that a firm’s 
bailout will cost 500m. However, if the firm is systemic, its failure without bailout will trigger the 
failure of other similarly situated firms in which diversified investors hold financial assets. If we 
assume that firm failure would trigger the failure of only three other firms at the same cost, the 
expected value to diversified investors is unlikely to remain positive (.8*50m+.2*-20m+.02*.1*2bn = -
4m).      
249 Lammertjan Dam and Michael Koetter, Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany, 
25 REV. FINANCIAL STUD. 2343, 2344-2345 (2012).  These authors point out, rightly, that the moral 
hazard problem consist (only) in the additional risk taking due to higher bailout expectations, which is 
usually not directly observable and cannot be inferred from the riskiness of bailed out banks; rather, 
what is required are variables that explain the likelihood of a bailout, but are uncorrelated with a bank’s 
risk taking. Dam and Koetter’s main contribution is the development of precisely such variables on the 
basis of regional political differences. They find an increase of bailout expectations increases risk 
taking, measured as the likelihood of distress. According to the authors, an ‘economically significant 
increase in risk taking thus provides evidence for moral hazard due to bailout expectations.’ 
250 AVGOULEAS, supra note 245, at 119. 
251 Schwarcz, supra note 243, at 767. 
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find that ‘[r]isk adjusted crash insurance prices for larger banks are lower than those 
of their smaller peers, indicating investors perceive differences in bailout likelihoods 
across institutions consistent with an implicit “too-big-to-fail” guarantee.’252  Whereas 
this result can still be explained on the basis of alternative factors, this is more 
difficult for recent empirical analysis on the effects of the BRRD. Jannic Cutura finds 
that bonds exposed to a potential BRRD bail-in faced increased yield spreads as 
compared to the control group of otherwise identical bonds issued by the same 
institution. For G-SIBs this effect was less pronounced.253 Moreover, Lea 
Steinbruecke shows that whereas agreement on BRRD and SRM and the associated 
decline in bail-out expectations initially reduced the relative funding advantage for 
large banks, the loss of credibility resulting from the Deutsche Bank bail-out 
speculations shortly after the new framework had become operational soon reinstated 
the ‘too-big-to-fail’ funding advantage.254        
 
The third element of the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem is the taxpayers’ exposure to losses. 
Even where loans have been repaid with interest and capital investments sold at a 
profit, because of the hidden direct costs of bailouts the net impact on government 
deficits may be negative. This means that resources need to be held back and are not 
available for a Keynesian stimulus package or investment in infrastructure, health 
care, or education.255 However, the issue goes deeper. The implicit or explicit ‘too-
big-to-fail’ government guarantee consists of a put option that allows creditors to 
assign any losses in excess of shareholders’ net worth to the taxpayer; and a stop-loss 
call option on the firm’s assets that allows the government as guarantor to take over 
the firm’s assets when the shareholders’ net worth approaches or becomes zero. This 
                                                        
252 Bryan Kelly, Hanno Lustig and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Too-Systemic-To-Fail: What Option 
Markets Imply About Sector-wide Government Guarantees, XX AM. ECON. REV. 1, 4 (2015). 
253 Janic Cutura, Debt holder monitoring and implicit guarantees: Did the BRRD improve market 
discipline?, 3 (Oct. 15, 2017); https://ssrn.com/abstract=305314. 
254 Lea Steinbruecke, Are European banks still too-big-to-fail? The impact of government interventions 
and regulatory reform on bailout expectations in the EU, 3-4 (Dec. 31 2017); 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3098296. The study demonstrates that paying higher prices for large 
European bank stocks is rational for investors because of the implicit state guarantee, as demonstrated 
by the loss in portfolio value immediately following the Lehman bankruptcy which signalled that even 
a large bank may fail. Portfolio losses were soon reversed when it became clear that no large European 
bank would be allowed to fail. 
255 Kane, supra note 188, at 4.  
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is the economic equivalent of holding an equity position.256 Where the government 
refuses to exercise the call option – because an institution is ‘too-big-to-fail’ – and 
continues to support the firm through liquidity assistance and explicit guarantees, it 
actually assumes a subordinated equity position with the taxpayer as residual risk 
bearer. Moral hazard induced risk taking with a view to increasing the return on 
equity directly transfers value from taxpayers through the put to shareholders and 
through stock options to the managers of ‘too-big-to-fail’ firms.257 The public seems 
to be at least subconsciously aware of these re-distributional effects, which accounts 
for the unpopularity of bailouts in the financial sector. When public resources are 
scarce and safety nets are being slashed, a blatant transfer from ‘poor to rich’ is 
difficult to justify.258 
 
c) Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
A bailout framework will likely facilitate pie-increasing bailouts if the availability of 
bailouts is limited to scenarios where bailout benefits are (likely to be) relatively 
large, whilst at the same time reducing the social costs to the greatest possible extent. 
The former may be ensured through the calibration of the bailout eligibility criteria 
and the interactions between the various system elements. Moral hazard, lack of 
market discipline and tax payer loss exposure may be reduced by letting an 
appropriate amount of losses lie where they fall, with a failing institution and its 
                                                        
256 Edward J. Kane, A Theory of How and Why Central-Bank Culture Supports Predatory Risk-Taking 
at Megabanks, INSTITUTE FOR NEW ECONOMIC THINKING WORKING PAPER No. 34, 22 (Dec. 14, 2015); 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2718733. 
257 Kane, supra note 188, at 21; Dell’Ariccia et al, supra note 225, at 8. The lack of proper loss 
compensation, despite government funds being fully repaid, can be seen by the difference in the rate of 
return on government and private investment. For example, in the case of Goldman Sachs, the rate of 
return on private investment was more than double the rate of return on the government bailout despite 
assuming the same level of risk. As Manns writes, ‘[t]he reward for helping Goldman Sachs bridge the 
depths of the crisis was a premature payout that left Goldman Sachs executives to reap the returns from 
the Treasury Department’s risk taking.’ Manns, supra note 7, at 1373-1377. 
258 This notion was already present in a famous letter that Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, Louis XVI’s 
controller-general of finances wrote to his king in 1774, warning him about the dangers of generous 
subsidies:  ‘Your Majesty knows that one of the largest obstacles to the economy is the multiple 
requests He is continuously assailed with, ... It is necessary, Sire, … to consider those from whom this 
money comes you can distribute to your courtiers, and compare the misery of those from whom it is 
sometimes required to tear off it by the most rigorous executions, with the situation of those who have 
more titles to obtain your liberalities;’ Letter of Turgot to the King, 24 October 1774; 
http://desguin.net/spip/spip.php?article55. 
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investors.259 The larger the (likely) benefits the more lenient cost reduction measures 
can be; or, vice versa, the more limited and uncertain the benefits of a bailout the 
stricter should be the measures applied with a view to reducing the social costs of 
bailouts.   
 
IV. Cost Reduction Mechanisms 
   
Moral hazard, lack of market discipline and taxpayer loss exposure can be addressed 
through ‘loss sharing mechanisms:’ an appropriate, that is, socially acceptable, 
amount of losses is allocated to the failing firm and its investors.260 Corporate 
insolvency law provides the ground rules of the game. Losses will be allocated in 
accordance with a predetermined order of priorities. Equity and debt investors know 
in advance their place within that order and can price their investments accordingly. A 
bailout by necessity deviates from the pre-established order of priority. The main 
purpose of a government intervention is usually that the default loss allocation 
framework is deemed to be inappropriate. At least some investors will receive more 
than they would have received under the default regime, at the expense of other 
classes of investors and/or the taxpayers in general. There will be winners and 
losers.261 The government decision as to who benefits and who loses out is inherently 
distributive and political. 262 To the extent that critical counterparties are spared from 
losses, non-critical counterparties and the taxpayer have to pick up the bill. Loss 
allocation may thus appear as a pure subsidy for certain ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
counterparties.263 Non-critical counterparties may be compensated for their additional 
loss absorption. However, this does not address the moral hazard issue, nor does it 
reduce taxpayers’ loss exposure, as the government will ultimately underwrite any 
compensation paid to non-critical counterparties. 
 
                                                        
259 Avgouleas & Goodhart, supra note 203, at 5; Dell’Ariccia et al, supra note 225, at 9: ‘[W]hen 
spillovers are relatively small, it is preferable to suffer their consequences than generate moral hazard 
by providing bail-outs. … [W]hen spillovers are particularly severe, for example, when an aggregate 
shock triggers a systemic banking crisis, it is preferable to tolerate the consequences of moral hazard 
than suffer the destabilizing effects associated with bail-ins.’  
260 Levitin, supra note 7, at 508. 
261 Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 7, at 24. 
262 Levitin, supra note 7, at 481. 
263 Id. at 510. 
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1) Corporate Insolvency Law 
 
Under corporate insolvency law, the allocation of losses is based on a predetermined 
statutory order of priority for the distribution of proceeds in liquidation. In 
restructuring proceedings the order of priority influences a creditor’s bargaining 
power in plan negotiations and may have a bearing on plan confirmation. Losses are 
allocated in accordance with the reverse order of priority; in principle, there is no 
room for government intervention. Losses are borne by a failing firm’s investors; and 
the taxpayer is off the hook.264 At least theoretically, this reduces the social costs 
associated with taxpayer loss exposure and lack of market discipline to zero. Moral 
hazard is kept in check by the insolvency process. In liquidation, management and 
risk takers will loose their jobs and their reputation may be severely tarnished. In a 
restructuring, senior management is likely to be replaced, either upon the appointment 
of an office holder or, in debtor-in-possession type proceedings, by a restructuring 
specialist. Lower level risk takers however may remain in place, and may even be 
incentivized with higher remuneration packages to stay with the firm. 
 
The statutory order of priority is currently a matter for national law. However, to 
some extent, the BRRD has harmonized the order of priority in resolution and normal 
insolvency proceedings. In particular,265 according to BRRD, Art 108(1) eligible 
deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises have a 
priority higher than claims of ordinary, unsecured creditors. To the extent that 
deposits are covered by deposit insurance, they have an even higher ranking than non-
covered eligible deposits. A deposit guarantee scheme subrogating to the rights of 
covered depositors has the same (higher) ranking as covered depositors.266 Other than 
ranking ahead of general unsecured creditors, the BRRD does not determine how the 
depositor preference relates to other classes of preferred creditors (if any) and to the 
holders of floating or fixed security interests. These are matters to be determined by 
                                                        
264 This is subject to the granting of State aid within the framework of national corporate insolvency 
law; see infra Part V.3). 
265 The BRRD also affords resolution authorities and financing arrangements preferred creditor status 
as regards their reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the resolution vis-à-vis the institution 
as well as a bridge institution or AMC; BRRD, Art 37(7). This essentially establishes an administrative 
expense priority for these claims.  
266 BRRD, Art 108. 
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national law.267 In order to enhance the effectiveness of the bail-in tool, the new Art 
108(2) has introduced the asset class of non-preferred senior debt, which has a 
ranking below ordinary unsecured claims and above capital instruments.268 The 
introduction of this new asset class is complementary to the TLAC and MREL 
standards, as it facilitates meeting the subordination requirement as a prerequisite for 
TLAC eligibility.    
 
Outside this area of harmonization, 269 the statutory orders of priority under national 
law vary significantly. The ranking of creditors can have important (re-)distributive 
effects. For example, a high ranking of employee wage claims benefits labour at the 
expense of investors; carve-outs from a security interest for the benefit of unsecured 
creditors270 may work to the advantage of customers and suppliers at the expense of 
financial institutions. A statutory subordination of shareholder loans271 benefits 
outside lenders at the cost of intra-group debt. Despite all the differences, it is 
                                                        
267 This is also true for the question as to how BRRD, Art 108(1) relates to BRRD, Art 109(1) dealing 
with the liability of deposit guarantee schemes. The amount of liability is based on the extent that 
covered depositors would have suffered losses if they had been treated similarly to the ‘creditors with 
the same level of priority under the national law governing normal insolvency proceedings’. Given that 
pursuant to Art 108(1), covered depositors have a ranking higher than ordinary, unsecured creditors, it 
is a question of national law whether there are any other creditors with a similar preferential status. 
268 Directive (EU) 2017/2399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 
amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency 
hierarchy, OJ EU 27.12.2017 L345/96. In order to qualify as non-preferred senior, a debt instrument 
must have an original maturity of at least one year, must not contain an embedded derivative or be a 
derivative itself, and the relevant documentation and prospectus must explicitly refer to the lower 
ranking. 
269 A further area of harmonization is the long-standing ‘super-priority’ of certain contracts between 
financial market participants involving the large-scale transfer of financial instruments or cash as 
collateral to cover exposures subject to (close-out) netting arrangements, usually under a master 
agreement: essentially, derivatives transactions, stock lending, and short-term repo financing. The 
European regime consists of Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems OJ EC 11.6.1998 
L166/45 and Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on 
financial collateral arrangements, OJ EC 27.6.2002 L168/43 (both amended by Directive 2009/44/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 amending Directive 98/26/EC on 
settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems and Directive 2002/47/EC on financial 
collateral arrangements as regards linked systems and credit claims, OJ EU 10.6.2009 L146/37). The 
covered financial contracts are exempt from key insolvency law provisions—the moratorium, certain 
avoidance powers, and possibly restrictions on the amendment or termination of rights and ipso facto 
clauses, thus, creating a de facto ‘super-priority’ for these contracts and their creditors. 
270 e.g. under English law, for floating charges created on or after 15 September 2003, the liquidator, 
administrator or receiver, as the case may be, has to make available for the satisfaction of unsecured 
debts a ‘prescribed part’ of the company’s net property. Insolvency Act 1986, s.176A(2). ‘Net 
property’ is the property that would be available for the satisfaction of floating charge holders in the 
absence of the provisions on the prescribed part. Currently, the prescribed part is for a net property of 
up to £10,000: 50%; for £10,000 and above: 50% of the first £10,000 and 20% of the excess; but not 
more than £600,000 overall; Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003, SI 2003/2097.  
271 For Germany: InsO, §39(1) No.5. 
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possible to discern a basic common structure: secured credit normally takes priority 
over administrative expenses, which rank ahead of general unsecured creditors, and 
equity. Depending on the legal system, further classes may be added: creditors with a 
super-priority, preferential creditors, subordinated creditors.272  
 
For example, under French law, certain employee claims273 enjoy a first-ranking so-
called super-priority.274 These claims take priority over administrative expenses and 
secured credit (as well as general unsecured creditors). In other legal systems, it is 
normally secured credit, which takes the top spot in the creditor hierarchy. However, 
there is great variation. German law distinguishes between secured creditors with a 
right to separation and secured creditors with a right to preferential satisfaction. The 
former can reclaim an asset that does not belong to the debtor’s estate,275 unaffected 
by insolvency proceedings. The latter merely have a right to preferential satisfaction 
out of the proceeds of the sale of collateral,276 with the realization of collateral being 
largely integrated into the insolvency process. Under French law, the claims of 
secured creditors with either a security interest on immovable property (hypothec) or 
with a fixed security interest in movable property take priority over all other claims, 
except the employee super-priority, the costs of the proceeding and the ‘new money’ 
priority.277  
 
In accordance with BRRD, Art 108(1), under both German278 and French law, 279 
eligible deposits take priority over general (unsecured) creditors (only). Within the 
new class of eligible depositors, covered deposits (up to the maximum amount of 
EUR100,000) and, following compensation of depositors, any claims to which the 
deposit insurance scheme has been subrogated, rank ahead of eligible deposits of 
natural persons as well as micro, small and medium sized enterprises that exceed the 
                                                        
272 EUROPEAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 166, at 240-250. 
273 For wages and reimbursement for accrued holidays incurred within 60 days prior to the 
commencement of proceedings. 
274 Trav. Art L3253-3, L3253-4; capped, however, at an amount equal to twice the maximum base for 
the calculation of contributions to the French national insurance system. 
275 InsO, §47. 
276 InsO, §§49, 50. 
277 Those who under a court approved conciliation agreement have made a contribution of fresh funds 
to the debtor or have supplied new assets or services to the debtor in order to ensure the continuation 
and long-term future of the debtor’s business activity enjoy the new money priority if subsequently 
safeguard or judicial reorganization or liquidation proceedings have been opened; Com. Art L611-11. 
278 KWG, §46f(4). 
279 Mon. Art L613-30-3. 
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maximum amount of coverage.280 Within each sub-class, depositors share on a pro 
rata basis. Following the payment of the classes that take priority, any remaining 
proceeds will be distributed to the general (unsecured) pre-commencement creditors 
in proportion to their admitted claims.281 Under German law, the payment of 
unsecured bonds and similar debt securities issued by credit institutions is contingent 
on the prior payment of all other general unsecured creditors.282 Consequently, senior 
unsecured bonds are to be paid in priority after the operational liabilities have been 
paid in full, but before the payment of any contractually subordinated (junior) 
instruments.283 This statutory subordination was introduced in anticipation of the new 
BRRD, Art 108(2) with a view to facilitating the effective application of bail-in as 
envisaged by the FSB’s TLAC requirements.284 French legislation has followed 
suit.285 Statutorily and contractually subordinated creditors will receive a dividend 
only after the general creditors have been satisfied in full. As residual claimants, 
shareholders, in the order of preference shares and ordinary shares, form the end of 
the line. 
 
On that basis, the loss allocation cascade in standard corporate insolvency 
proceedings looks as follows: equity takes first losses, followed by hybrid instruments 
and subordinated debt;286 any losses remaining thereafter are borne by general 
unsecured creditors and, depending on the legal system, by preferential creditors. 
Even secured creditors and creditors with a super-priority may sustain losses: for 
example where collateral value has declined below the nominal amount of the secured 
debt, or where the settlement of terminated derivative contracts is delayed with 
adverse consequences for the counterparty. The only constituency that is shielded287 
                                                        
280 On Spanish law: Decision of the Single Resolution Board, supra note 121, at para 17 and 18. 
281 Com. Art L643-8. 
282 KWG, §46f(5).  
283 KWG, §46f(6) and (7). 
284 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung – Abwicklungsmechanismusgesetz, Deutscher Bundestag, 
Drucksache 18/5009, 76 (May 25, 2015). 
285 Mon. Art 613-30-3. 
286 Under the new BRRD, Art 48(6a) Member States are required to ensure that in their applicable 
national insolvency laws claims resulting from own funds items (common equity tier 1, additional tier 
1 and tier 2) rank below any claims not resulting from own funds items; inserted by Directive 
2019/___/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2019 amending Directive 
2014/59/EU on loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity of credit institutions and investment firms 
and amending Directive 98/26/EC, Directive 2002/47/EC, Directive 2012/30/EU, Directive 
2011/35/EU, Directive 2005/56/EC, Directive 2004/25/EC and Directive 2007/36/EC OJ 2019 ____. 
287 Shielded only to the extent that the relevant deposit guarantee scheme has the necessary funds. The 
proposed European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) that would progressively mutualize deposit 
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from losses is the covered depositors, which will be compensated by the relevant 
deposit guarantee schemes, with the latter then taking their place within the loss 
allocation cascade. 
 
The impact of a statutory order of priority on the social costs associated with a lack of 
market discipline depends on whether and to what extent there is room for priority 
deviations. To the extent that certain creditors or classes of creditors may receive a 
treatment in insolvency that is more beneficial than under the statutory loss allocation 
regime, market discipline may be compromised. A deviation from the statutory order 
of priority may occur under an administrative regime and within court-centered 
frameworks. Pre-commencement and post-commencement contractual modifications 
of the loss allocation framework may be imposed on dissenting creditors, possibly on 
the basis of a plan of reorganization, subject to affirmation by the court. Irrespective 
of a creditor agreement, under both types of insolvency regime the court or the 
relevant administrative authority may have the power to rewrite the statutory order of 
priority to a greater or lesser extent. In any case, the feasibility of a 
deviation/rewriting depends on the rigor and stringency with which the pari passu 
principle and the absolute priority rule, both part of national insolvency laws to 
varying degrees, are applied and enforced. The former seeks to ensure that all 
creditors within the same class (if there are any) are treated equally and 
proportionately on the basis of their pre-insolvency entitlements and that no creditor 
obtains preferential treatment.288 It may prevent a contractual arrangement from 
taking effect that would allow certain (unsecured) creditors to opt out of pari passu 
distribution to their advantage,289 or the affirmation by the court of a plan of 
reorganization that violates the pari passu principle.290 The absolute priority rule291 
seeks to ensure that a plan of reorganization respects the order of priority established 
                                                                                                                                                              
insurance within the Euro-zone remains on the agenda but faces significant political opposition; 
SCHILLIG, supra note 43, at 319 (para 12.15). 
288 EUROPEAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 166, at 240; also British Eagle International Airlines Ltd v 
Compagnie Air France [1975] 1 WLR 758, 780G-H, per Lord Cross. 
289 British Eagle International Airlines Ltd v Compagnie Air France [1975] 1 WLR 758; also National 
Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen Presswork & Assemblies Ltd [1972] AC 785. 
290 Because they have no (adverse) effect on the rights of the remaining creditors, contractual 
subordination agreements remain valid; EUROPEAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 166, at 246; Re 
Maxwell Communications Corp (No 2) [1993] BCC 369, 377 per Vinolett J; Re SSSL Realisations 
(2002) Ltd [2005] [2004] EWHC 1760 (Ch) [45] per Lloyd J; Re Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander Ltd 
[2010] EWCH 316 (Ch) [10] per Blair J. 
291 Case v Los Angeles Lumber Products Co, 308 US 106, 117 (1939): ‘rule of full or absolute 
priority’. 
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outside of insolvency proceedings under non-insolvency law; a plan cannot be 
imposed on dissenting creditor classes if there pre-insolvency priority would thereby 
be compromised.292 Both mechanisms realize their effect ex ante: if strictly applied, 
the court will not confirm a plan of reorganization, and neither court nor 
administrative authority will be able to rewrite the statutory order of priority with the 
result that an envisaged restructuring or liquidation cannot take effect. The strength of 
these principles varies greatly between jurisdictions. Sometimes a rewriting of 
priorities is merely subject to the adequate protection of creditors’ interests, a test 
which may be satisfied where a creditor is not worse off than they would have been in 
a hypothetical liquidation.293 Arguably this test would not prevent other similarly 
situated creditors, and even junior classes, from receiving a more favorable treatment 
under the plan than they would under the statutory regime. 
 
2) BRRD/SRM Resolution Framework 
 
Under the BRRD/SRM resolution framework, the application of resolution tools and 
powers is reserved for circumstances where resolution is necessary in the public 
interest and other options are not readily available.294 Consequently, financial 
institutions should be resolved primarily through the normal corporate insolvency 
process. This means that shareholders and creditors absorb losses; to the extent that 
covered depositors are present, the relevant deposit guarantee scheme is required to 
contribute. Private sources of funding – existing shareholders and creditors, willing 
purchasers and providers of new finance – are the preferred means of resolution 
funding. 
 
Where resolution is justified on systemic grounds,295 the general resolution principles 
apply. These require that the management body and senior management of a failing 
institution are replaced, except where their retention is necessary in order to achieve 
                                                        
292 Accordingly, and possibly subject to a ‘new value’ exception, under a plan proposal, no creditor 
may receive more than the nominal value of their claim and no creditor junior to the class opposing the 
proposal, including shareholders, may receive any value; further no creditor of equal ranking with the 
opposing class may obtain better treatment than that class. For German law: InsO §245(2); similar 
principles apply for the shareholders as opposing class, InsO §245(3). 
293 EUROPEAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 166, at 322-324. 
294 BRRD, Art 32(1); SRMR, Art 18(1). 
295 Binder, Systemkrisenbewältigung, supra note 177, 61. 
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the resolution objectives.296  Thus, moral hazard is addressed in a way not dissimilar 
to standard corporate insolvency law; and again the requirement to replace 
management does usually not affect risk-takers below management level. In respect 
of market discipline, the general resolution principles establish a schedule for the 
allocation of losses amongst the different stakeholder constituencies: Shareholders 
bear first losses; creditors bear losses after the shareholders in accordance with the 
order of priority of their claims under national law, unless provided otherwise under 
the BRRD/SRM framework; creditors of the same class must be treated in an 
equitable manner; covered deposits are fully protected; and resolution action must be 
taken in accordance with the safeguards provided for under BRRD and SRM. 
Moreover, no creditor shall incur greater losses in resolution than they would have 
incurred if the institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, 
installing the ‘no-creditor-worse-off’ principle.297 BRRD and SRM take the national 
orders of priority of claims as a base line, subject to the modifications introduced by 
BRRD and SRM in form of a general depositor preference and the non-preferred 
senior asset class.298 The ex ante protections of pari passu and absolute priority are 
replaced with the vague, and essentially ex post, standard of the ‘no-creditor-worse-
off’ principle.299 This is reflective of the resolution authority’s discretion to derogate 
from national creditor rankings, the extent of which depends on the resolution tools 
and powers to be applied, subject to the principle of proportionality.300 
 
In accordance with the principle that shareholders should bear first losses,301 relevant 
capital instruments must be written down or converted where the resolution authority 
decides to apply a resolution action that would result in losses being borne by 
creditors.302 A write down of capital instruments is not actually a resolution tool303 
and may occur either independently of, or within resolution and as a prerequisite for 
                                                        
296 BRRD, Art 34(1)(c); SRMR, Art 15(1)(c). 
297 BRRD, Art 34(1); SRMR, Art 15(1). 
298 BRRD, Art 108; SRMR, Art 17. BRRD, Art 48(6a) mandates the ranking of claims emanating from 
own funds items below claims arising from instruments that do not qualify as own funds, see supra 
note 286. 
299 Jens-Hinrich Binder, The Position of Creditors Under the BRRD, in COMMEMORATIVE VOLUME IN 
MEMORY OF PROFESSOR DR. LEONIDAS GEORGAKOPOULOS, BANK OF GREECE’S CENTER FOR CULTURE, 
RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION, 37, 47-50 (2016). 
300 Binder, Proportionality, supra note 177, at 11. 
301 BRRD, Art 34(1)(a); SRMR, Art 15(1)(a). 
302 BRRD, Art 37(2); SRMR, Art 21(1)(a). 
303 Wojcik, supra note 176, at 99. 
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the application of resolution tools and powers.304 In applying the write down power, 
CET1 instruments305 are written down first in proportion to the losses and up to their 
capacity by either cancelling them or severely diluting them through conversion of 
existing debt into equity.306  Thus, depending on the amount of losses, common shares 
may be cancelled and the existing shareholders wiped out. Thereafter, the principal 
amount of, first, Additional Tier 1 instruments,307 and following that, Tier 2 
instruments is to be written down or converted to CET1 instruments, permanently, 
and, in principle, without compensation,308 to the extent necessary to achieve the 
resolution objectives or up to the respective loss absorbing capacity, whatever is the 
lower. The power to write down and convert capital instruments has been applied in 
the resolution of Spanish banking group Banco Popular.309  
 
Following a write down of capital instruments, the BRRD/SRM loss allocation 
principles differ depending on whether the resolution authority applies the transfer 
tools (sale of business, bridge institution and asset management company) or the bail-
in tool. Loss allocation under the transfer tools is determined exclusively by the 
general resolution principles, affording the resolution authority a wide margin of 
discretion, subject to the principle of proportionality.310 In deciding which liabilities 
are to be transferred to a private sector purchaser or bridge institution, and will thus 
be fully protected and insulated from losses, the resolution authority must take the 
order of priority of claims under applicable national insolvency law as a baseline.311  
However, the resolution authority may deviate from this national order of priority, 
subject only to the principle that creditors of the same class are to be treated 
                                                        
304 BRRD, Art 59(1). Irrespective of whether resolution tools and powers are exercised or not, where 
either the ‘appropriate authority’ determines that the institution meets the conditions for resolution; or 
the appropriate authority determines that in the absence of a write down the institution will no longer 
be viable; which is essentially the conditions for resolution minus the public interest requirement; 
BRRD, Art 59(3) and (4); SRMR, Art 21(1)(b)-(d) and (3). Capital instruments must further be written 
down where the institution or group requires extraordinary public financial support; BRRD, Art 
59(3)(e); SRMR, Art 21(1)(e). 
305 BRRD, Art 2(68), Art 28 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 
306 BRRD, Art 60(1)(a); SRM, Art 21(10)(a). 
307 These may have been written down or converted already on the basis of their terms providing for a 
trigger event at the point of the CET1 capital ratio falling below 5.125%; Art 54 of Regulation (EU) 
No. 575/2013.  
308 Where it subsequently transpires, in the course of the final valuation, that the amount of the write 
down exceeded what was necessary, a write up mechanism applies to reimburse affected creditors and 
shareholders; BRRD, Art 46(3).  
309 See supra Part III.3). 
310 Binder, Proportionality, supra note 177, at 11. 
311 See the resolution principles in BRRD, Art 34(1)(b), (f) and (g); SRMR, Art 15(1)(b), (f) and (g). 
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equitably, not equally. For example, Portuguese bank Banko Espirito Santo was 
resolved by creating a bridge bank (Novo Banco) and transferring all liabilities to it 
except certain ‘excluded liabilities’ in accordance with statutory transfer restrictions. 
In Goldman Sachs International v Novo Banco, it was contested among the parties 
whether the facility agreement at issue had in fact been transferred or fell into the 
category of excluded liabilities.312 Special safeguards are in place for secured 
creditors, regardless of whether the security arises from a security interest proper, 
title-based funding, or set-off and netting provisions. A partial transfer of rights and 
liabilities to another entity must not result in a disturbance of these arrangements.313 
The discrimination between various groups of creditors equally ranked under national 
insolvency law is likely to be the rule, rather than the exception. The application of 
resolution tools and powers with a view to ensuring the continuity of critical functions 
and to preserving financial stability by necessity entails the selection and transfer of 
certain systemically important contractual relationships that are essential for 
achieving the resolution objectives, and the leaving behind and eventual liquidation of 
the remaining non-systemic arrangements.314 In these scenarios, the ‘no-creditor-
worse-off’ principle requires the ex post compensation of left behind shareholders and 
creditors to the extent that they incurred greater losses in resolution than they would 
have incurred if the institution had been wound up under normal insolvency 
proceedings.315  
 
The loss allocation principles for the bail-in tool are much more prescriptive and the 
resolution authority’s margin of discretion is considerably narrower. The bail-in tool 
applies to all liabilities that are not excluded.316 On the basis of a fair and reasonable 
                                                        
312 Goldman Sachs International v Novo Banco [2018] EWSC 34; the Supreme Court had to decide, in 
the context of a dispute concerning jurisdiction of the English courts pursuant to a jurisdiction clause in 
a facility agreement, whether certain measures taken by the Bank of Portugal as resolution authority 
overseeing the resolution had to be recognised in England. It was held that an English court had to treat 
the liability at issue as never having been transferred to the bridge bank, Novo Banco. As a 
consequence, it was never party to the jurisdiction clause. 
313 BRRD, Arts 76-78. 
314 Binder, supra note 299, at  49. 
315 BRRD, Arts 73-75. 
316 BRRD, Art 44(1); SRMR, Art 27(1). Excluded liabilities are limited to covered deposits; secured 
liabilities up to the amount of the value of the collateral; liabilities arising from the holding of client 
assets or client money; fiduciary liabilities; short term liabilities with an original maturity of less than 
seven days (where owed to a clearing or settlement system with a remaining maturity of less than seven 
days); and certain liabilities owed to employees, commercial and trade creditors, and tax and social 
security claims provided they are treated as preferential under national insolvency law; as well as 
contributions owed to a Deposit Guarantee Scheme; BRRD, Art 44(2); SRMR, Art 27(3). 
 55 
valuation,317 existing shares are either cancelled or ‘severely diluted’ by converting 
eligible liabilities into shares at an appropriate rate of conversion.318  Thereafter, 
BRRD and SRM establish a waterfall for exercising the bail-in tool that, in principle, 
follows the reverse order of priority under general corporate insolvency law.319 
Within each class, losses are to be allocated on a pro-rata basis.320  
In exceptional circumstances, resolution authorities may exclude certain eligible 
liabilities where this is strictly necessary and proportionate to ensure continuity of 
critical functions or to prevent widespread contagion.321 In order to ensure the 
functionality of the bail-in tool,322 banks and investment firms are required to 
maintain at all times a certain minimum level of bail-inable debt in form of a 
sufficient aggregate amount of own funds and eligible liabilities expressed as a 
percentage of total liabilities (MREL). A sufficiently large layer of long-term, high-
quality and easy to bail-in capital is essential for the credibility of a bail-in framework 
as it provides assurance for senior creditors that their claims will remain untouched, 
thus preventing a flight-to-safety and signaling that bail-in is actually likely to 
occur.323 For global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), the FSB has issued a new 
minimum total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirement.324 MREL and TLAC 
constitute complementary elements of a common framework that seeks to ensure that 
institutions have sufficient loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity. 325 Pursuant to 
the amended BRRD and SRMR, GSIBs and so called ‘top tier banks’ with total assets 
                                                        
317 BRRD, Art 46(1); SRMR, Art 27(13). Where the bail-in tool is applied in order to recapitalize an 
institution or to capitalize a bridge bank, the aggregate amount thus established must be sufficient to 
restore the CET1 capital ratio of the institution, to sustain sufficient market confidence in it and to 
allow it to continue to comply with the conditions for authorization and to carry on the activities for 
which it was authorized for at least one year; BRRD, Art 46(2); SRMR, Art 27(13)(b). 
318 BRRD, Art 47(1). 
319 BRRD, Art 48; SRMR, Arts 27(15), 17. 
320 BRRD, Art 48(2). 
321 BRRD, Art 44(3); SRMR, Art 27(5). When doing so, resolution authorities must have regard to the 
order of preference under national law. Wojcik, supra note 176, at 109. 
322 Id. at 113. 
323 Tröger, supra note 202, at 10; Jon Cunliff, Ending Too-Big-to-Fail: How Best to Deal with Failed 
Large Banks, 2016.2 EUROPEAN ECONOMY 59, 66. 
324 Financial Stability Board, Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalization Capacity of G-SIBs in 
Resolution (Nov. 9, 2015); http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/TLAC-Principles-and-Term-Sheet-
for-publication-final.pdf. 
325 Directive 2019/__/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2019 amending 
Directive 2014/59/EU on loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of credit institutions and 
investment firms and amending Directive 98/26/EC, Directive 2002/47/EC, Directive 2012/30/EU, 
Directive 2011/35/EU, Directive 2005/56/EC, Directive 2004/25/EC and Directive 2007/36/EC, OJ 
___, Recital (2); Regulation (EU) 2019/___ of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards the loss-absorbing and recapitalisation 
capacity of credit institutions and investment firms, OJ ____, Recital (2). 
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exceeding EUR100bn will be subject to standard TLAC/MREL minimum 
requirements; which may also be imposed on smaller institutions below the 
EUR100bn threshold, provided their failure is deemed to pose systemic risks. For 
these institutions, resolution authorities shall ensure that a part of the respective 
MREL requirement equal to the minimum loss absorption amount of 8% of total 
liabilities is met with own funds and subordinated liabilities. All institutions, 
including those that are neither GSIBs, nor top tier banks nor deemed to pose 
systemic risks, will be subject to institution-specific requirements to be determined by 
the relevant resolution authority. Interestingly, the resolution authority may request 
any institution to meet its MREL requirements with own funds and subordinated 
eligible instruments, in particular when there is a clear indication that bailed-in 
creditors are likely to bear losses in resolution that would exceed their potential losses 
in insolvency.326 It has been argued, that the only plausible explanation for imposing 
MREL requirements on institutions that are not systemically important and could be 
resolved through standard corporate insolvency law is that any liabilities senior to 
MREL instruments should never have to bear any losses.327 This would mean a 
significant alignment of the loss allocation schedules under all three subsystems: for 
most cases the sharing of losses would be cut off at the level of subordinated debt 
instruments and no senior unsecured creditor would have to be asked to contribute.328 
However, it remains doubtful whether smaller institutions that follow a traditional 
business model and for their funding mainly rely on capital instruments and deposits 
with limited capital markets access will be able to easily comply with stringent MREL 
requirements.329         
 
The exclusion of certain liabilities, automatically330 or at the discretion of the 
resolution authority, from the scope of the bail-in tool may constitute a deviation from 
                                                        
326 BRRD, Art 45b(4) and (5), 45c(5) and (6); SRMR, Art 12c(4) and (5), 12d(4) and (5). 
327 Tobias Tröger, Why MREL Won’t Help Much, EBI WORKING PAPER SERIES 2017 – No. 13, 10 
(Aug. 2017); https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023185.  
328 Thomas Conlon and John Cotter, Anatomy of a Bail-In, UCD GEARY INSTITUTE DISCUSSION PAPER 
SERIES GEARY WP 2014/05, 4 (March 2014); https://ideas.repec.org/p/ucd/wpaper/201405.html: 
Retrospectively studying the proportion of liabilities that authorities would have needed to bail-in to 
cover losses associated with the global financial crisis, the authors find ‘that a bail-in mechanism that 
largely impacts subordinated investors would help reduce the danger of flight-to-safety, in particular 
limiting the impact of bank runs by depositors.’ 
329 Restoy, supra note 85, at 4 and 6. 
330 Although, in this respect, it could be argued that the list of excluded liabilities constitutes a pre-
publicized modification of the statutory order of priorities which allows private investors to price the 
respective debt instruments accordingly; Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 6, at 242. 
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the ranking of creditors under national insolvency laws. The regulatory framework 
allows the write down and conversion of senior claims before junior debt has been 
extinguished, contrary to the absolute priority principle.331 It transforms excluded 
liabilities into preferred liabilities, whereas equally ranking bail-inable instruments 
will be subordinated and potentially worse off in resolution than they would have 
been under otherwise applicable corporate insolvency law.332 Under the ‘no-creditor-
worse-off’ principle, the bailed-in creditors may be compensated ex post through a 
payout from the resolution financing arrangements.333   
 
In order to provide the necessary funding for the resolution process, the EU resolution 
framework has established standing resolution funds, pre-funded by risk-calibrated 
financial industry contributions. The European System of Financing Arrangements 
under the BRRD consists of national financing arrangements, borrowing, between 
national financing arrangements, and the mutualisation of national financing 
arrangements in the case of a group resolution.334 As part of the Banking Union, the 
SRM relies on a Single Resolution Fund (SRF).335 The presence of pre-financed 
standing resolution funds reduces taxpayers’ loss exposure but does not eliminate it 
completely, as these funds are ultimately underwritten by the Member States. Where 
the funds turn out to be insufficient, taxpayers will have to pick up the bill. This will 
remain the case even following the installation of the envisaged common backstop in 
form of a revolving credit line provided by the ESM to the SRF.336 The ESM 
members ultimately provide the funding for the ESM itself. Resolution authorities 
may draw on financing arrangements only to the extent that this is necessary to ensure 
                                                        
331 Id.  
332 If the institution were to be wound up under normal insolvency law all (senior) unsecured general 
creditors would share in the proceeds of the pool of assets available for distributions on a pro rata 
basis. 
333 BRRD, Art 75. 
334 BRRD, Art 99. 
335 Contributions are raised by participating Member States at the national level through the national 
financing arrangements und subsequently transferred to the SRF on the basis of an Intergovernmental 
Agreement between the participating Member States.  Until the Fund reaches its target level, but not 
later than 8 years from its inception, the SRF remains divided into national compartments, to which the 
contributions raised at national level are to be transferred. The national compartments are progressively 
mutualized during the transitional period: by 40% in the second year; 60% in the third year; and by an 
additional 6.67% in each of the remaining five years. Eventually the national compartments will be 
merged into a single compartment. 
336 See supra note 44. 
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the effective application of resolution tools and powers.337 Financing arrangements 
may not be used to directly absorb the losses of an institution under resolution or to 
recapitalize it, other than in the context of bail-in.338 Indirectly, losses may be passed 
on to the financing arrangements where, for example, contributions made to a bridge 
bank or asset management vehicle cannot be fully recouped through a subsequent sale 
of the bridge or a liquidation of the assets under management; and also where 
creditors have to be compensated in accordance with the ‘no-worse-off’ principle. 
Moreover, where eligible liabilities have been excluded from the application of bail-
in, and the losses to be born by these liabilities cannot be passed on fully to other 
creditors, the resolution fund may be used to absorb losses directly.339 Direct and 
indirect loss absorption by the fund is subject to restrictions: Shareholders and 
creditors must have contributed to loss absorption an amount of not less than 8% of 
total liabilities, including own funds, through write down or conversion or otherwise; 
whereas the fund’s contribution must not exceed 5% of total liabilities, including own 
funds, of the institution under resolution, as established through an independent 
valuation.340 The 8% minimum requirement derives from a review of bank 
recapitalizations in Europe during the height of the crisis, which revealed that banks 
could have been restored to viability if 8% of own funds and eligible liabilities would 
have been used for loss absorption.341 The 5% fund aid limit further restricts the 
exposure to losses of national budgets and taxpayers. Fund aid is subject to the State 
aid regime and requires prior approval by the Commission.342 Where losses exceed 
13% of total liabilities, a further round of bail-in may allocate residual losses to 
                                                        
337 For that purpose, funds may be used to guarantee the assets or liabilities of, or to make loans to, the 
institution under resolution, a bridge bank or an asset management vehicle; to purchase the assets of the 
institution under resolution, to make contributions to a bridge bank or an asset management vehicle; to 
compensate shareholders or creditors in accordance with the ‘no-worse-off’ principles; to make a 
contribution to the institution under resolution in lieu of the write down or conversion of liabilities 
where the bail-in tool is applied and the resolution authority has excluded certain creditors from the 
scope of the bail-in tool; to lend to other financing arrangements on a voluntary basis; or for a 
combination of these actions; BRRD, Art 101. 
338 BRRD, Art 101(2). 
339 BRRD, Art 44(4); 101(1)(f). 
340 BRRD, Art 44(5); 101(2). The funds for such contribution to loss absorption may come from ex 
ante contributions, extraordinary ex post contributions and alternative financing sources. Not however, 
it seems, from borrowing between financing arrangements; BRRD, Art 44(6). The 8% minimum 
contribution and 5% cap do not apply to liquidity support measures of the resolution fund; 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 26, para 18. 
341 SVEN SCHELO, BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION 120 (2015); see also Clara Galliani & Stefano 
Zedda, Will the Bail-in Break the Vicious Circle Between Banks and their Sovereign?, 45 COMPUT. 
ECON. 597-614 (2015), showing ‘that a bail-in of 8% of the total balance sheet would potentially be 
effective in breaking the vicious circle and preventing contagion between banks and public finances.’  
342 BRRD, Recital (47); SRMR, Art 19(1) and (3). 
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creditors to the extent possible343 before the following funding resources can be 
tapped into:  
 
In extraordinary circumstances, the resolution authority may seek funding from 
‘alternative financing resources’ – that is, borrowing from financial institutions and 
third parties other than financing arrangements – to make a further contribution to loss 
absorption exceeding the 5% limit, provided that all unsecured, non-preferred 
liabilities, other than eligible deposits have been written down or converted in full. 
Alternatively or additionally, the contribution may be made from unused resources 
raised through ex ante contributions.344 Any such contribution beyond the 5% limit 
would be subject to the State aid regime. 
 
Only in the very extraordinary situation of a systemic crisis345 may the resolution 
authority seek additional funding from alternative financing sources through 
‘government financial stabilisation tools’ in the form of a ‘public equity support tool’ 
and a temporary public ownership tool.346 These government financial stabilization 
tools can only be used where the institution under resolution is maintained as a going 
concern347 and only as a last resort after the other resolution tools have been exploited 
to the maximum extent practicable whilst maintaining financial stability.348 Because 
                                                        
343 Avgouleas & Goodhart, supra note 203, at 12-13. 
344 BRRD, Art 44(7); SRMR, Art 27(9) - (10). For institutions with assets of less than EUR 900 bn on a 
consolidated basis, resolution financing arrangements may contribute to loss absorption of up to 5% of 
total liabilities including own funds, provided that shareholders and creditors have contributed to loss 
absorption an amount of not less than 20% of risk weighted assets, and the financing arrangement’s 
resources raised through ex ante contributions are at least 3% of covered deposits of all credit 
institutions authorized in the respective Member State; BRRD, Art 44(8). 
345 ‘Systemic crisis’ is defined as ‘a disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious 
negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy. All types of financial 
intermediaries, markets and infrastructure may be potentially systemically important to some degree.’; 
BRRD, Art 2(1) point (95). As Gortsos has pointed out, a ‘systemic crisis’ is sufficient to result in a 
‘very extraordinary situation’; it does not have to be a ‘very extraordinary crisis’; Christos V. Gortsos, 
A poisonous (?) mix: Bail-out of credit institutions combined with bail-in of their liabilities under the 
BRRD – The use of ‘government financial stabilisation tools (GFSTs), 11 (Oct. 12, 2016); 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2876508. 
346 BRRD, Art 37(1), 56. The public equity support tool allows a Member State to participate in the 
recapitalization of an institution by providing capital in exchange for capital instruments; BRRD, Art 
57. Under the temporary public ownership tool, the shares in an institution may be temporarily 
transferred, on the basis of one or more share transfer orders, to a nominee of a Member State or a 
company wholly owned by a Member State; BRRD, Art 58.  
347 BRRD, Recital (8). 
348 The application of government financial stabilization tools is subject to the general conditions for 
resolution plus the determination that the application of resolution tools would not suffice to either 
avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, or protect the public interest where extraordinary 
liquidity assistance has previously been given. In addition, application of the temporary public 
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of the limitation to going concern resolutions, government financial stabilisation tools 
are in principle only compatible with the bail-in tool (and asset separation tool where 
combined with bail-in).349 Shareholders and creditors must have contributed to loss 
absorption and recapitalization an amount equal to at least 8% of total liabilities 
including own funds and approval must have been obtained under the EU State aid 
framework.350 Moreover, the applied resolution strategy must ensure that the 
taxpayers are the beneficiaries of any surplus that may result from the restructuring of 
an institution that is returned to viability – the assumption of risk must be adequately 
rewarded.351 It is not entirely clear, whether government financial stabilization tools 
also apply within the SRM.352 The SRM Regulation is silent on this issue. Given that 
government financial stabilization tools are only available where the application of 
resolution tools is insufficient for avoiding significant adverse effects on financial 
stability, it is probably fair to assume that these measures would be available even 
within the SRM framework.  
 
Finally, a Member State of the ESM – currently all Euro-zone Member Sates – may 
request a Direct Bank Recapitalization.353 Any financial assistance is to be granted 
subject to conditionality354 and strict eligibility criteria. Bail-in, national bailouts and 
indirect bank recapitalization take precedence.355 Thus, in line with the SRM, direct 
bank recapitalization may only be provided where shareholders and creditors have 
absorbed losses to an amount of at least 8% of total liabilities, the resolution financing 
                                                                                                                                                              
ownership tool requires the determination that the application of resolution tools in combination with 
the public equity support tool would not suffice to protect the public interest. Hadjiemmanuil, supra 
note 30, at 105-106. 
349 Gortsos, supra note 345, at 10: sale of business and bridge institution tools are likely to result in the 
becoming of a gone concern of the institution under resolution as the residual entity. 
350 BRRD, Art 37(10); Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 6, at 228; Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 30 at 106; 
Avgouleas & Goodhart, supra note 203, at 13; J-H Binder, Systemkrisenbewältigung, supra note 177, 
at 69. 
351 BRRD, Recital (8). 
352 Busch et al, supra note 126, at 10-11; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 26, at 31 note 
48: ‘such tools would not be available in member states participating in the SRM.’ 
353 When, in accordance with current plans, the ESM takes on the role as provider of a common 
backstop to the SRF, Direct Bank Recapitalization will no longer be available; Terms of reference of 
the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (4 December 2018), available at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37268/tor-backstop_041218_final_clean.pdf. 
354 ESM Guideline, Art 1(1) and (4). Under the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
establishment of the European Monetary Fund, COM(2017) 827 final, the EMF, replacing the ESM, 
would have as a new task the provision of credit lines and guarantees in support of the SRB for any of 
the responsibilities assigned to it.  
355 Christos Hadjiemmanuil, Bank Resolution Financing in the Banking Union, LSE LAW, SOCIETY 
AND ECONOMY WORKING PAPERS 6/2015, 31 (March 2015); http://ssrn.com/abstract=2575372. 
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arrangement has contributed an amount of 5% of total liabilities, and all unsecured, 
non-preferred liabilities, other than eligible deposits, have been written down or 
converted in full.356 
 
Thus, whereas under standard insolvency law losses are to be fully absorbed by 
investors in accordance with a (largely) mandatory order of priority, under the 
BRRD/SRM resolution framework only the following constituencies may be asked to 
contribute to loss absorption: the holders of CET1 instruments (shareholders), the 
holders of capital instruments (Additional Tier1 and Tier2), the holders of 
subordinated debt, and the holders of unsecured senior debt. Only covered depositors 
will never have to bear any losses. Further, whereas under standard insolvency law 
the absolute priority rule and the pari passu principle prevent the derogation from 
statutory priority rules and the discrimination within classes ex ante, under 
BRRD/SRM the resolution authority has discretion to deviate from the applicable 
order of priority on systemic risk grounds and to treat creditors of the same class 
unequally (provided they are being treated equitably).357 Investors are protected 
largely ex post through a vague and difficult to apply ‘no-worse-off’ principle.358 
However, shareholders and creditors are required in all cases to absorb a minimum 
amount of losses of 8% of total liabilities before further losses can be passed on to the 
relevant resolution financing arrangement. Fund aid is limited to 5% of total 
liabilities. Any additional fund aid or state aid beyond the 5% limit is subject to strict 
pre-conditions. Although the BRRD/SRM loss allocation regime is conceived as 
mandatory, the practical reality may be quite different, depending on the exercise of 
discretion on a case-by-case basis.359  
 
3) EU State Aid Regime 
 
Loss allocation under the EU State aid regime is governed by the rules on burden-
sharing pursuant to the Commission’s Banking Communication. Accordingly, losses 
are normally first absorbed by equity; thereafter, the holders of hybrid instruments 
                                                        
356 ESM Guideline, Art 8(3). 
357 BRRD, Art 48(5) with Art 44(2) and (3); Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 6, at 237. 
358 Wojcik, supra note 176, at 120-122; Avgouleas & Goodhart, supra note 203, at 18, pointing out the 
risk of litigation that the ‘no-worse-off’ principle is likely to generate. 
359 Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 6, at 236. 
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and subordinated debt contribute to reducing the capital shortfall to the greatest 
possible extent. Such contribution may take the form of a conversion into CET1 
instruments or a write-down of the principal of the instruments. Cash outflows from 
the beneficiary to the holders of such instruments must be prevented to the greatest 
extent that is legally possible. In deviation from the BRRD/SRM resolution 
framework, a contribution from senior debt holders, notably uninsured deposits, 
bonds and other senior debt, will not be required as a mandatory prerequisite for 
approval under the State aid rules.360 In any case, State aid must not be granted before 
equity, hybrid capital and subordinated debt have fully contributed to offsetting any 
losses. Subordinated debt must be converted or written down, in principle, before 
state aid is granted. An exception to these requirements can be made where their 
implementation would endanger financial stability or lead to disproportionate results, 
in particular where the aid amount is small in comparison to the bank’s risk weighted 
assets and the capital shortfall has been reduced significantly through capital raising 
measures. The ‘no-creditor-worse-off’ principle applies: subordinated creditors 
should not receive less in economic terms than what their instruments would have 
been worth if no State aid were to be granted.361 As soft law measure, the Banking 
Communication imposes a limit on the exercise of the Commission’s discretion when 
approving State aid. However, a Member State may still notify the Commission of aid 
that does not comply with the guidelines and the Commission may authorize the 
proposed aid in exceptional circumstances.362 Overall, this system affords the 
Commission a wide margin of discretion to deviate from national orders of priority 
and even from its own loss sharing requirements where the Commission sees fit to do 
so.363 Under the Banking Communications, the replacement of a failing firm’s 
management is not a necessary prerequisite, but may be looked upon favorably by the 
Commission.364 Although aid should be limited to the necessary minimum amount, 
there is no cap on the amount of State aid that may be provided and no minimum 
amount of loss contribution by shareholders and creditors.    
 
                                                        
360 Through the new MREL requirement, the situation under BRRD/SRM may be aligned with the 
BANKING COMMUNICATION, supra note 57, in that instruments senior to MREL should never bear 
losses; supra text accompanying and following note 310.  
361 BANKING COMMUNICATION, supra note 57, at paras. 41-46; Wojcik, supra note 176, at 105. 
362 C-526/14 Kotnik and others ECLI:EU:C:2016:570 para 38-44. 
363 Hellwig, supra note 35, at para 2.5. 
364 Gerard, supra note 15, at 241. 
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Where State aid is subject to approval within the BRRD/SRM resolution framework, 
the BRRD/SRM loss allocation cascade takes precedence. This is the case for fund 
aid up to the 5% loss contribution ceiling, and beyond, as well as in the context of 
government financial stabilization tools and direct bank recapitalization through the 
ESM. In these cases, shareholders and creditors, including bail-inable senior creditors, 




The implications for the respective bailout costs may be illustrated with a simple 
numerical example. Consider an institution with assets of 100 funded by covered 
deposits of nominal 20, senior unsecured debt of 60, and capital instruments of 







Covered deposits                                  20 
 
Senior unsecured debt                          60 
 
Capital Instruments                              10 
Equity                                                   10 
 
Now assume that asset values take a hit and have to be written down to 70. In 
liquidation, of the (net) proceeds of 70, 20 would go to the deposit guarantee scheme 
subrogated for the covered depositors; the remaining 50 would be shared by senior 
unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis, resulting in losses of ca. 17% on their claims. 
Capital instruments and equity would be wiped out. Generally, corporate insolvency 
law addresses the social costs of bailouts most effectively. Losses are fully absorbed 
by equity and debt investors. Only covered depositors – whose ability to exert market 
discipline is very limited – are safe. For instruments other than covered deposits, 
market discipline would be restored. Within the corporate insolvency law framework, 
there is in principle no room for State intervention and taxpayer loss exposure would 
                                                        
365 Gortsos, supra note 345, at 18. 
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be limited to the amount paid out to depositors (maximum 20) that is not covered by 
industry contributions to the deposit insurance scheme and cannot be recouped in 
liquidation.  
 
Now assume that resolution is necessary in the public interest due to the presence of 
systemically important counterparties of nominal 20 among the senior unsecured debt. 







Covered deposits                                  20 
Senior unsecured debt                           
Non-bail-inable                                    20 
Bail-inable                                            40 
Capital Instruments                              10 
Equity                                                   10 
 
The BRRD/SRM resolution framework seeks to reduce the social costs of bailout 
through a mandatory loss allocation cascade. Equity, capital instruments, 
subordinated debt and senior unsecured debt may be called upon to contribute to the 
absorption of losses, not, however, secured debt and preferential debt, including 
covered deposits. The framework leaves considerable room for differential treatment 
of creditors of the same class and the beneficial treatment of creditors and classes in 
deviation of the statutory order of priority.366 Thus, in our example, equity would be 
wiped out and capital instruments would be written down to zero. Of the bail-inable 
debt of 40, 10 could be written down to zero to absorb the remaining losses; and a 
further 10 may be converted to equity at par (with a market value of 10) in order to 
recapitalize the institution. Non-bail-inable debt and covered deposits remain 
unscathed. On the basis of the ‘no-creditor-worse-off’ principle disadvantaged 
creditors are entitled to ex post compensation. Bailed-in senior unsecured debt has 
sustained a loss of 25%, which exceeds the loss they would have sustained in 
liquidation so that they would have to be compensated for the difference (3.2) out of 
                                                        
366 Wojcik, supra note 176, at 130; Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 6, at 242. 
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the resolution fund.367 The mobilization of resolution fund money requires a 
minimum loss contribution of shareholders and creditors of 8% of total liabilities and 
is, in principle, capped at 5% of total liabilities. Market discipline will be enhanced 
for those investors that contribute to loss absorption; not however for those whose 
claims are transferred to a private sector purchaser or bridge bank or exempt from 
bail-in. As compared to liquidation under national corporate insolvency law, taxpayer 
loss exposure would increase by the amount to be paid out in compensation under the 
‘no-worse-off’ principle and not covered by industry contributions. Overall, however, 
it is limited by the 8% minimum contribution requirement, the 5% cap and generally 
through the reliance on standing resolution funds. 
 
The State aid regime requires a contribution to loss absorption of equity, capital 
instruments and subordinated debt only; senior unsecured debt and any higher-
ranking debt will remain untouched. Moreover, the Commission has wide discretion 
for differential treatment of creditors within the same class and across classes, subject 
only to the ‘no-worse-off’ principle.368 There is no minimum amount of loss 
contribution by investors and no cap on the amount of public money that may be 
advanced. In our example, only equity and the holders of capital instruments would 
sustain losses and would be wiped out. The remaining loss and capital shortfall would 
be covered by the Member State by injecting new capital and possibly taking an 
equity position. Taxpayer loss exposure would be increased by the full amount of 
remaining losses and capital shortfall; the restoration of market discipline would be 
limited to equity and capital instruments. 
          
V. Calibrating Costs and Benefits: Intra-System Interactions  
 
Given the disparity in bailout cost reduction mechanisms between the system 
elements, it is essential that the respective eligibility criteria and intra-system 
interactions ensure that it is more likely than not that the potential bailout benefits 
outweigh the bailout costs. Eligibility criteria and intra-system interactions are 
responsible for matching potentially high bailout benefits with lenient cost reduction 
                                                        
367 In liquidation our senior unsecured debt of 40 would have received an amount of 33.2; in resolution 
it would only be 30 (including equity with a market value of 10).  
368 Gortsos, supra note 345, at 18. 
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mechanisms, and for ensuring stringent burden sharing of investors where bailout 
benefits are (likely to be) limited. 
 
The transition between BRRD/SRM, national corporate insolvency law and EU State 
aid is determined primarily by the delineation of the BRRD/SRM resolution trigger. 
Under BRRD and SRM, the application of resolution tools and powers is 
conceptualized as an alternative and exception to ‘normal insolvency proceedings.’369 
Where the public interest requirement as a condition for resolution is not satisfied, 
‘normal insolvency proceedings’ apply as the default option for resolving distressed 
financial institutions.370 Within their scope of application, the BRRD and SRM 
resolution regimes supersede and displace the applicable national corporate 
insolvency law.371 As between BRRD/SRM and State aid, where the use of resolution 
tools and powers involves the granting of State aid in the form of an intervention by 
resolution funds and deposit guarantee schemes, the relevant State aid rules apply 
concurrently with the BRRD/SRM framework. The latter also allows for State aid 
outside the resolution framework in certain closely circumscribed instances. Where 
resolution is unavailable, the Sate aid rules apply concurrently with standard 
corporate insolvency law and may override and modify the latter. 
 
1) The BRRD/SRM Resolution Trigger 
 
 
A credit institution or investment firm shall be put into resolution where (i) the 
competent authority, after consulting the resolution authority,372 determines that the 
institution is failing or likely to fail; (ii) there is no reasonable prospect that in the 
absence of a resolution action the failure of the institution could be prevented within a 
reasonable timeframe through alternative measures, in particular supervisory action 
                                                        
369 BRRD, Art 32(1)(c) and (5); SRMR, Art 18(1)(c) and (5); Wojcik, supra note 176, at 99. 
370 The new BRRD, Art 32b makes this clear: failing institutions the resolution of which is not in the 
public interest ‘shall be wound up in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national 
law;’ see also SRMR, Art 18(8): where the Council object to a resolution scheme on the ground that 
the public interest requirement is not satisfied, the relevant entity is to be wound up under national 
insolvency law. 
371 BRRD, Art 86: Resolution prevents the commencement of normal insolvency proceedings under 
national law, except on initiative of or with the consent of the resolution authority. 
372  Or vice versa, if the Member State so provides and resolution authorities have access to the 
information necessary in order to make the determination of failure; BRRD, Art 32(2).    
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and private sector measures; and (iii) a resolution action is necessary in the public 
interest,373 which will be the case if it achieves, and is proportionate to, one or more 
of the resolution objectives,374 and winding up of the institution pursuant to normal 
insolvency proceedings would not meet those objectives to the same extent. 
 
In addition to a breach of capital requirements, illiquidity and insolvency375, an 
institution will be deemed to be failing or likely to fail when it requires extraordinary 
public financial support.376 ‘Extraordinary public financial support’ is defined as State 
aid under Art 107(1) TFEU and any other public financial support at supra-national 
level, which, if provided for at national level, would constitute State aid, that is 
provided in order to preserve or restore the viability, liquidity or solvency of a 
financial institution.377 This definition makes the concept of ‘State aid’ an integral 
part of the BRRD/SRM framework and State aid may, in principle, only be granted 
subject to the BRRD/SRM loss allocation cascade with its 8% minimum contribution 
and 5% cap.378  
 
Advances from national industry financed resolution funds and deposit guarantee 
schemes amount to State aid in accordance with general State aid doctrine.379 Funds 
that derive from private sources – such as ex ante contributions to a standing fund or a 
levy on the banking sector – may constitute aid to the extent that disbursements from 
the private fund are controlled by the State and the respective decision as to the fund’s 
deployment is imputable to the State.380 The resolution authority as emanation of the 
                                                        
373 BRRD, Art 32(1); SRMR, Art 18(1). 
374 When applying resolution tools and powers resolution authorities must aim (i) to ensure the 
continuity of critical functions; (ii) to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, including 
by preventing contagion and maintaining market discipline; (iii) to protect public funds by minimizing 
reliance on extraordinary public financial support; (iv) to protect depositors as well as client funds and 
assets; and (v) to minimize the cost of resolution and avoid the unnecessary destruction of value; 
BRRD, Art 31(2); SRMR, Art 14(2). 
375 BRRD, Art 32(4) (a) – (c); SRMR, Art 18(4)(a) – (c); see EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, FINAL 
REPORT: GUIDELINES ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN AN 
INSTITUTION SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS FAILING OR LIKELY TO FAIL UNDER ARTICLE 32(6) OF DIRECTIVE 
2014/59/EU (EBA/GL/2015/07, 26 May 2015); 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1085517/EBA-GL-2015-
07+GL+on+failing+or+likely+to+fail.pdf. 
376 BRRD, Art 32(4)(d); SRMR, Art 18(4)(d). 
377 BRRD, 2(1)(28); SRMR, Art 3(1)(29.). 
378 Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 30, at 109 (‘supporting role within the resolution framework’s financing 
cascade’). 
379 Case 290/83 Commission v France ECLI:EU:C:1985:37 para 15. 
380 BANKING COMMUNICATION, supra not 57, at para 63-64. 
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State is ultimately in control of the funding decision and, by implicitly underwriting 
these funds, there is always a potential burden on State finances.381 Given that the 
participating Member States are also ultimately behind the SRF and the European 
Stability Mechanism, it is likely that financial support granted through these 
institutions would also meet the State aid definition;382 in any case the reference to 
supra-national support measures makes it clear that such support is covered by the 
definition of ‘extraordinary public financial support.’  
 
According to the Banking Communication, a public intervention does not constitute 
Sate aid and therefore ‘extraordinary public financial support’ if it takes the form of 
central bank emergency liquidity assistance and meets the following requirements: (i) 
the recipient institution is temporarily illiquid but solvent at the time of the liquidity 
assistance which occurs in exceptional circumstances and is not part of a larger aid 
package; (ii) the facility is fully secured by collateral to which appropriate haircuts are 
applied; (iii) the central bank charges a penal interest rate to the beneficiary; and (iv) 
the measure is taken at the central bank’s own initiative and is not backed by a state 
guarantee. Such facilities are deemed to not be selective and do not amount to aid.383 
Also, there is no burden on the State because central bank liquidity can be freely 
created at no cost to the State.384 Liquidity assistance on this basis is subject to neither 
the BRRD/SRM nor the State aid framework. The emergency liquidity assistance that 
Banco Popular received from the Bank of Spain in June 2017, which was used up 
within 2 days comes under this heading. It demonstrates that these measures are not 
costless in terms of there implications for moral hazard and market discipline: certain 
sophisticated creditors were allowed to exit without sustaining any losses. Moreover, 
where granted to doubtfully solvent institutions, emergency liquidity assistance may 
only delay the inevitable, resulting in increased costs for the taxpayer, in particular 
where the exiting sophisticated investors are then replaced by retail investors.385        
 
2) EU State Aid Only: ‘Precautionary Recapitalization’ 
 
                                                        
381 Case 290/83 Commission v France ECLI:EU:C:1985:37 para 15. 
382 François-Charles Laprévote & Mélanie Paron, The Commission’s Decisional Practice on State Aids 
to Banks: An Update, 2015 Eur. St. Aid L. Q. 88, 89-91. 
383 See supra Part II. 
384 RYAN-COLLINS, GREENHAM, WERNER & JACKSON, supra note 36, at 67. 
385 Hellwig, supra note 35, at para 2.5. 
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In general, an institution’s need for extraordinary public financial support will trigger 
the application of the resolution framework including its mandatory loss allocation 
cascade, provided there is no private sector option available and resolution is 
necessary in the public interest.386 However, exceptionally, the BRRD/SRM 
resolution framework will not be triggered, and the measure will be assessed 
exclusively on the basis of the State aid regime, where extraordinary public financial 
support takes the form of a so-called ‘precautionary recapitalization.’387 This is 
extraordinary public financial support through an injection of own funds or the 
purchase of capital instruments.388 It will not trigger the resolution framework and 
will be subject exclusively to the State aid regime if (i) support is being granted in 
order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and to 
preserve financial stability; (ii) the beneficiary is solvent; (iii) the measure is of a 
precautionary and temporary nature and proportionate for remedying the 
consequences of a serious disturbance; (iv) it is not used to offset losses that the 
institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future; (v) the injection of own 
funds or purchase of capital instruments is made at prices and on terms that do not 
confer an advantage upon the institution, that is, it is made at market prices and not as 
overpayment; (vi) the institution is not failing on other grounds; and (vii) a 
precautionary recapitalization is limited to injections necessary to address a capital 
shortfall established through a stress-test or similar exercise conducted by the ECB, 
EBA or national authorities.389 Precautionary recapitalization is conceptualized as an 
exception to the resolution framework, reserved for unique situations and subject to 
strict conditions, some of which are puzzling and ambiguous, possibly due to sloppy 
drafting. For example, the solvency requirement seems to be ill at ease with the 
additional requirement that the institution must not be failing or likely to fail; that the 
injected amounts may not be used to offset losses incurred or likely to be incurred in 
                                                        
386 BRRD, Art 32(4)(d); SRMR, Art 18(4)(d). 
387 Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 30, at 109; Gortsos, supra note 345, at 16. In addition, state guarantees 
to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks according to the central bank’s conditions, and 
state guarantees of newly issued liabilities do not trigger resolution, subject to the following conditions 
(i) to (iv). 
388 BRRD, Art 32(4)(d)(III); SRMR, Art 18(4)(d)(III). 
389 See EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, GUIDELINES ON THE TYPES OF TESTS, REVIEWS AND 
EXERCISES THAT MAY LEAD TO SUPPORT MEASURES UNDER ARTICLE 32(4)(D)(III) OF THE BANK 




the near future is open to various interpretations; the no-advantage condition does not 
seem to fit with the assessment under the State aid framework (the adjective ‘undue’ 
would appear to be missing); the temporary and precautionary nature of any injection 
also raises questions.390 According to the SRB’s chair, Elke Koenig, precautionary 
recapitalization may only be used to cover a capital shortfall arising under the adverse 
scenario of a stress test; capital shortfalls under the baseline scenario should be 
covered by private means or trigger resolution or insolvency. Solvency – a positive 
net worth in the baseline scenario – is a static criterion to be assessed at the moment 
of determination. By contrast, the further requirement of the institution not failing and 
not being likely to fail on grounds of insolvency, illiquidity or undercapitalization is a 
forward looking concept assessing the institution’s overall viability.391 At face value, 
these are strict prerequisites, however, in practice they may not pose an 
insurmountable hurdle for transitioning out of the BRRD/SRM framework and into 
the State aid regime.392 
 
The ‘precautionary recapitalization’ exit clause has been relied on for the 
recapitalization of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), Italy’s fourth largest 
lender.393 In July 2016, an EBA stress test revealed a CET1 ratio of -2.4% in the 
adverse scenario, amounting to a capital shortfall of EUR5bn. Capital in the baseline 
scenario was positive. The bank’s market capitalization had decreased from EUR10bn 
in 2008 to EUR500m by end 2016. An envisaged private sector recapitalization failed 
due to the uncertain political situation following a failed referendum in Italy. After a 
lengthy negotiation process, a restructuring plan seeking to ensure the bank’s long-
                                                        
390 Nicolas Veron, Precautionary recapitalization: time for review, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN-DEPTH-
ANALYSIS (July 2017) para 3 (available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/602090/IPOL_IDA(2017)602090_EN.pdf)
. Willem-Pieter de Groen, Precautionary recapitalization: time for review, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN-
DEPTH-ANALYSIS (July 2017) para 4 (available at 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PrecautionaryRecapitalisations.pdf); Hellwig, supra note 35, at para 
3. 
391 FINANCIAL RISK AND STABILITY NETWORK, FINANCIAL STABILITY CONFERENCE REPORT 2017 (Oct. 
18, 2017) 33-34; http://financial-stability.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Report_Financial-Stability-
Conference-2017.pdf. 
392 Binder, Systemkrisenbewältigung, supra note 177, at 70; Hellwig, supra note 35, at para 4; but see 
Veron, supra note 390, at para 4 (arguing that in the past ‘the conditions for precautionary 
recapitalization were assessed rigorously by the relevant EU authorities’). 
393 Banca D’Italia, The ‘precautionary recapitalization’ of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (Dec. 29,  
2016); https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/approfondimenti/2016/ricapitalizzazione-mps/precautionary-
recapitalization-MPS.pdf?language_id=1.   
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term viability was agreed between Commission, ECB and the Italian authorities.394 
The plan envisaged a 5-year restructuring period, with a reorientation of the business 
model towards retail and SME customers and a strengthening of efficiency through 
branch closures, layoffs, and an executive pay cap. The plan also included the 
disposal of MPS’ non-performing loan portfolio. The burden of the by then 
EUR8.8bn capital shortfall was shared as follows: of the EUR6.3bn required to 
realign the CET1 ratio to 8%, EUR4.3bn resulted from the conversion of junior bonds 
into equity and the resulting dilution of existing shareholders; EUR2.1bn were 
provided by the Italian state. As compensation for eliminating the subordinated bonds 
as capital instruments, a further EUR2.5bn were provided by the Italian State to reach 
a total capital ratio of 11.5%. In order to compensate retail junior bondholders who 
allegedly were the victims of misselling, a further EUR2bn were necessary to fund the 
exchange of converted shares into senior MPS bonds. It is questionable whether the 
strict prerequisites of the precautionary recapitalization exemption were rigorously 
applied in case of MPS.395 The bank had been struggling ever since the global 
financial crisis and the ever-increasing capital shortfall (EUR5bn to almost EUR9bn 
over a six months period) raises serious doubts as to MPS’ overall viability. On the 
other hand, it is well known that there were good political reasons for not applying the 
BRRD/SRM resolution framework, notably retail investors holding junior debt and 
the overall fragility of the Italian banking sector.396 This suggests that the pre-
requisites for a precautionary recapitalization are malleable and susceptible to 
political manipulation, opening up escape routes into a more lenient burden-sharing 
regime.397  
 
3) Default Regime: Corporate Insolvency Law 
 
 
                                                        
394 European Commission – Statement, Statement on Agreement in principle between Commissioner 
Vestager and Italian authorities on Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) (June 1, 2017); 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-1502_en.htm;  European Commission – Press 
Release, State aid: Commission authorizes precautionary recapitalization of Italian bank Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena (July 4, 2017); http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1905_en.htm. 
395 Binder, Systemkrisenbewältigung, supra note 177, at 70-71; but see Veron, supra note 390, at para 4 
(‘open to debate, but not altogether implausible’). 
396 James Politi, Monte dei Paschi shortfall hits EUR8bn, says ECB, FT, Dec. 26, 2016; FT View, The 
rescue of Italian lender will not end banking woes, FT, June 1, 2017. 
397 Binder, Systemkrisenbewältigung, supra note 177, at 71; Gortsos, supra note 345, at 18. 
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Where the resolution authority determines that resolution pursuant to BRRD/SRM is 
not in the public interest, the failing institution is to be dealt with under the applicable 
national insolvency law as the default option.398 Whether the BRRD/SRM resolution 
framework will be triggered in any given case is largely a matter of discretionary 
judgment on the part of the resolution authority.399 For example, the presence in the 
market of institutions with a business model that is similar to that of the failing 
institution may support the assumption of an enhanced risk of contagion justifying 
resolution;400 or may suggest easy substitutability of the functions provided by the 
institution so that corporate insolvency would be sufficient.401 Under the SRM, the 
Commission may propose to the Council to object to the scheme on the basis that the 
public interest requirement has not been met.402 Where the Council objects on public 
interest grounds the entity is to be wound up under national insolvency law.403 Thus, 
acting in concert with the Commission, a simple majority of Member States may 
object to a resolution scheme with the effect that the failing institution can be resolved 
under national insolvency law. Whereas the SRM has always been clear that the entity 
is to be wound up under national insolvency law where the Council so objects, this 
was less obvious where the resolution authority determined that the public interest 
requirement has not been met. The newly inserted BRRD, Art 32b now provides that 
an institution the resolution of which is not in the public interest shall be wound down 
in accordance with national law. Although it seems to be clear that the institution as a 
legal entity has to be liquidated, this does not seem to preclude a reorganization of 
(parts of) its business on a going concern basis where this is possible under national 
insolvency law and would not adversely affect any of the resolution objectives.404 
 
When Latvian Bank ABLV and its Luxembourg subsidiary had to be closed in the 
wake of allegations of money laundering, sanctions violations and bribery, the SRB 
decided for both institutions that resolution was not in the public interest: the 
                                                        
398 BRRD, Art 32(5), 32b; SRMR, Art 18(5). Binder, Proportionality, supra note 177, at 8: resolution 
‘reserved as an ultima ratio for extraordinary scenarios, namely failures of systemically relevant 
institutions.’ 
399 Binder et al, supra note 35, at 12. 
400 Decision of the Single Resolution Board, supra note 121, at para 4.4.2. 
401 Decision of the Single Resolution Board (Veneto Banca), supra note 122, at para 4.2.1.1; Decision 
of the Single Resolution Board (Banca Popplare di Vicenza), supra note 122, at para 4.2.1.1. 
402 SRMR, Art 18(7).  
403 SRMR, Art 18(8). 
404 See Decision of the Single Resolution Board, supra note 121, at para 4.3: winding up as referring to 
applicable Spanish insolvency law in its entirety, presumably including the restructuring option. 
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functions they performed were not critical and their financial and operational 
interconnectedness with other institutions was limited.405 Consequently, both 
institutions have been liquidated under Latvian and Luxembourg insolvency law, 
respectively. However, the mandatory order of priority under national corporate 
insolvency law does not prevent the granting by a Member State of State aid to a 
failing institution, which will then be assessed under the EU State aid regime. This is 
not specific to financial institutions; approval by the Commission of State aid in the 
corporate rescue and restructuring context has a long history, and Commission 
practice has been codified in the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.406 The handing 
back of failing institutions to national insolvency law combined with generous State 
aid support can be observed in the cases of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto 
Banca, two regional banks active in the Veneto Region with total assets of 
EUR34.4bn and EUR27.9bn, respectively.407 On 23 June 2017, the ECB determined 
that both banks were failing or likely to fail on the basis that they had repeatedly 
breached their capital requirements. On the same day, the SRB determined that there 
was no private sector or regulatory alternative: the banks were unable to raise 
sufficient additional capital, their business plans lacked credibility; and a write down 
and conversion of capital instruments would be insufficient to remedy the breach of 
capital requirements. The SRB further determined that resolution under BRRD/SRM 
was not in the public interest: although classified by the ECB as significant 
institutions, business volumes had been rapidly declining and neither institution had 
been classified as systemically important; the deposit-taking, lending and payment 
services provided by the institutions were not critical because these services were 
provided only to a limited number of third parties and were easily replaceable; 
moreover, failure was unlikely to result in significant adverse effects on financial 
stability due to the banks’ low financial and operational interconnections. Therefore, 
normal insolvency law was deemed to be sufficient as it offered a comparable degree 
of protection for depositors, investors and clients. In particular, the Italian bank 
                                                        
405 Single Resolution Board, Notice summarising the decision taken in respect of ABLV Bank, AS 
(Feb. 2018); https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/ablv; Single Resolution Board, Notice summerising the 
decision taken in respect of ABLV Bank Luxembourg S.A. (Feb. 2018); 
https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/ablv. 
406 R&R GUIDELINES, supra note 145, replacing previous guidelines the earliest of which were 
promulgated in 1994.   
407 European Commission, State Aid SA. 45664 (2017/N) – Italy – Orderly liquidation of Banca 
Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca – liquidation aid, Brussels, 25.6.2017 C(2017)4501 final. 
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specific insolvency law provides for the transfer of assets and liabilities, so that 
covered deposits could be protected in a way similar to resolution, thus achieving the 
resolution objectives just as effectively.408 This decision opened the door for 
liquidation under Italian insolvency law, financed through extensive State aid. As a 
result of an open sales process, the bank Intesa Sanpaolo bought the deposits, 
employees, senior debt and performing loans for the symbolic amount of EUR1 out of 
the liquidation. The Italian State contributed EUR4.8bn by way of a cash injection to 
shore up Intesa’s capital in respect of the taking on of risky assets from the banks and 
the granting of loans to finance the liquidation. In addition, the Italian State 
guaranteed the repayment of these loans to the tune of EUR12bn for the eventuality 
that the proceeds of the liquidations turn out to be insufficient. The Commission 
approved the State aid on the basis that it was necessary to avoid an economic 
disturbance in the Veneto region. The shareholders and junior creditors fully 
contributed to loss absorption by staying behind in the liquidation. However, junior 




The decision by the SRB that resolution was not in the public interest – because 
failure was unlikely to cause significant adverse effects for financial stability – and 
the Commission’s decision approving liquidation aid as being necessary to avoid an 
economic disturbance in the Vento region demonstrate the operation of two different 
public interest tests. The ‘resolution public interest’ test requires that resolution is 
necessary and proportionate for the achievement of one or more of the resolution 
objectives, notably to avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial system, and 
winding up the failing institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not 
meet these resolution objectives to the same extent.410 This threshold had not been 
met in the case of the Veneto region banks. Pursuant to TFEU, Art 107(3)(b), State 
aid may be considered to be compatible with the internal market where the aid seeks 
to ‘remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State.’ The liquidation 
                                                        
408 Decision of the Single Resolution Board (Veneto Banca), supra note 122; Decision of the Single 
Resolution Board (Banca Popplare di Vicenza) supra note 122. 
409 European Commission, supra note 407. 
410 Binder, Proportionality, supra note 177, at 7. 
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aid in the case of the Veneto region banks was held to meet this threshold. In its 
Decision,411 the Commission seems to indicate that in deviation from the wording of 
the provision, a disturbance in the region of a Member State was sufficient. This 
would be contrary to the case law of the General Court, which held that ‘the 
disturbance in question must affect the whole of the economy of the Member State 
concerned, and not merely that of one of its regions or parts of its territory.’412 In any 
case, it is clear that the State aid threshold as applied by the Commission is lower than 
the resolution threshold applied by the SRB. As a consequence, institutions that did 
not pose any systemic risk and the services of which would have been easily 
replaceable were not subjected to loss allocation under national insolvency law, 
neither were they subject to the limited loss allocation under BRRD/SRM with an 8% 
minimum contribution and the 5% fund aid ceiling. Rather, the State aid burden 
sharing rules applied, based on soft law, limited to shareholders and subordinated 
creditors with no minimum contribution and aid ceiling. On that basis, no bank seems 
to be too small for it or its senior creditors to be bailed out with State aid.413 In 
addition, Intesa Sanpaolo, Italy’s second largest bank, has become even bigger with 
generous support from the Italian State. 
 
From the perspective of the overall system objective – to ensure that when they occur, 
bailouts are pie-increasing – this result makes little sense: a lower risk to financial 
stability and therefore limited bailout benefits may justify a more comprehensive 
public intervention with less restrictive burden sharing mechanism, resulting in higher 
potential bailout costs. However, the SRB and the Commission are independent 
institutions; as a hallmark of their independence they may come to different 
conclusions on a given set of facts when applying different legal texts the rationales 
of which do not perfectly overlap. The resolution threshold has a dual rationale. It, 
first, justifies and seeks to legitimize a departure from the base line loss allocation 
standards in corporate insolvency. It allows the resolution authority to modify and 
override the statutory order of priority by disregarding pari passu and absolute 
priority for the benefit of certain systemically important counterparties at the expense 
                                                        
411 European Commission, supra note 407, at para 49 where the Commission refers to a note in which 
the Bank of Italy lays down the grounds for the State aid measures (‘risk of a serious disturbance to 
real economy at local level’). 
412 Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:326 
para 167. 
413 Gebski, supra note 60, at 94. 
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of others, the latter being protected only by the ‘no-worse-off’ principle. Secondly, 
and closely related, the resolution threshold seeks to justify the intrusive re-writing of 
property rights through the exercise of resolution tools and powers, which is liable to 
interfere with the institution’s and its investors’ rights to property as protected under 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights414 and the European Convention of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Such interference may only be justified 
in the public interest and subject to the principle of proportionality and may require 
fair compensation.415 By contrast, the State aid threshold does not have the function of 
justifying interferences with property rights. In particular, conditioning the approval 
of State aid on burden sharing measures being imposed on shareholders and 
(subordinated) creditors does not amount to an interference with their rights to 
property. These constituencies would have suffered losses at least to the same extent 
if no State aid had been granted.416 Rather, in accordance with the State aid regime’s 
primary rationale, the State aid threshold seeks to justify primarily possible distortions 
of inter- and intra-State competition caused by State aid measures. On that basis, it is 
plausible to assume that limited distortions caused by State aid granted to 
insignificant firms may be more easily justified on the basis of a lower threshold. 
Viewed in isolation, the Commission’s decision in the Veneto region banks’ case is 
perhaps not so surprising. However, granting and approving State aid measures in 
these cases also results in a departure from the baseline loss sharing arrangement, 
which is justified by the secondary rationale of the State aid framework for the 
financial sector: financial stability. It is here that the rationales of the resolution 
threshold and the State aid threshold meet. Given that the EU bailout elements 
constitute a system with a clearly demarcated system objective, divergent decisions of 
the key independent institutions within this area of overlap result in incoherence as 
measured against the overall system goal. 
 
VI. Conclusion: Improving System Goal Attainment Capacity   
 
                                                        
414 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010/C 83/02) OJ EU 30.3.2010 C83/389. 
The Charter was rendered legally binding by the Lisbon Treaty, affording it the same status as the 
Treaties; TEU, Art 6(1). 
415 EU NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, COMMENTARY OF THE 
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 166 (2006); 
https://sites.uclouvain.be/cridho/documents/Download.Rep/NetworkCommentaryFinal.pdf. 
416 C-526/14 Kotnik and others ECLI:EU:C:2016:570 para 61-80. 
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The goal of the EU’s bailout system is to limit bailouts to those that are likely to be 
‘pie-increasing’ – that is, where expected social benefits exceed expected social costs. 
The system currently lacks output legitimacy because its goal attainment capacity is 
significantly diminished. First, it invites extensive bailouts of institutions that are 
likely to generate at best only modest bailout benefits. ‘Minor institutions’ may be 
resolved through national corporate insolvency law, supported by generous State aid 
packages granted by the home Member State, as was the case with Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza and Veneto Banca. The State aid regime overrides the baseline loss sharing 
arrangement under national corporate insolvency law, combining a limited and ‘soft’ 
bailout cost reduction mechanism with limited bailout benefits. Accordingly, under 
the EU bailout system, every bank is systemically important and no bank is too small 
to be bailed out.417 This is perhaps tolerable. The bailout of minor institutions with 
few counterparties at limited cost is unlikely to generate high hidden costs, even in the 
absence of strict cost reduction measures. The ensuing bailouts may not be pie-
increasing; but the overall ‘damage’ is likely to be limited.  
 
Secondly, and more importantly, resolution authorities have a strong incentive to 
avoid the difficult decisions that would be required under the BRRD/SRM loss 
allocation regime: any decision as to the constituencies that should be called upon to 
contribute to the loss absorption minimum requirement will invite public scrutiny and 
criticism and is likely to generate extensive litigation. ‘Hard cases’ are therefore likely 
to be resolved through a public bailout subject only to the State aid framework, using 
any of the escape routes available. Zombie banks like Monte dei Paschi di Siena may 
be propped up through a very flexible interpretation of the prerequisites for a 
‘precautionary recapitalization.’ Still more worrying, the vagueness of the public 
interest threshold in resolution would seem to allow the ‘handing back’ of a ‘national 
champion’ or any global systemically important institution, to national insolvency law 
and the State aid regime. Where a (powerful) national government strikes a deal with 
the Commission on the granting of State aid to an ailing national giant, it may easily 
be argued that resolution under BRRD/SRM would not meet the resolution objectives 
of ensuring the continuity of critical functions and avoiding adverse effects on the 
financial system to the same extent as resolution under national insolvency law 
                                                        
417 Gebski, supra note 60, at 94. 
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combined with generous State aid would.418 As the Bank of Italy has argued, where 
the SRB has decided to launch the BRRD/SRM procedure, the entire value of the 
equity and the junior bonds of an institution may be lost, and senior bonds and 
unprotected deposits may be subject to bail-in. This may generate higher costs for all 
the parties involved: the State, banking customers and the rest of the banking system, 
contrary to the goal of minimizing the costs of resolution and avoiding the destruction 
of value.419 As Hellwig has pointed out, if the Bank of Italy’s argument were accepted 
it would simply mean that banks would be entitled to fund at the low costs that are 
available under an implicit taxpayers’ guarantee for their debt.420 In these cases 
potential bailout benefits are likely to be high, but so are the hidden potential costs. 
Strict bailout cost reduction measures could make all the difference. As it stands, the 
BRRD/SRM’s strict loss allocation cascade is likely to be relevant for only a small 
number of ‘easy cases’ where the application of resolution tools and powers is 
straightforward, the potential spillover effects limited and/or the political implications 
minimal,421 as with Spanish banking group Banco Popular. And even here, the true 
costs may remain largely hidden.  
 
Given that the system goal is pre-mandated by international standard setters, the 
actual system outcome may be aligned with the system purpose by modifying either 
the behavior of individual system elements or their interactions.422 Recent reforms 
target the behavior of the system elements. Facilitated by the introduction of the new 
asset class of non-preferred senior debt, the new MREL regime allows resolution 
authorities to request any institution to meet its institution specific MREL 
requirements with subordinated debt instruments with a view to ensuring that the 
resolution entity can be resolved in a manner suitable to meet the resolution 
objectives. Where the resolution authority utilizes this power and requires an 
                                                        
418 The new BRRD, Art 32b mandating the wind down of an institution under national law if resolution 
is deemed to not be in the public interest would not make a difference here. Where possible under 
national law, the institution’s business (or parts thereof) could be transferred on a going concern basis 
out of the liquidation to a private sector buyer or a newly incorporated holding structure perhaps with a 
new banking license; the residual entity could be wound down. The transaction could be funded by 
generous State aid.    
419 See https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/fact/2017/0712-venete-anticipo/index.html. 
420 Hellwig, supra note 35, para at 2.5. 
421 Binder, Systemkrisenbewältigung, supra note 177, at 68; Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 6, at 247. 
422 MEADOWS, supra note 27, at 16. 
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institution to issue subordinated debt even if only to cover the loss absorption amount, 
the loss allocation schedules under all three systems would be significantly aligned.  
 
If we modify our earlier example by introducing an additional layer of debt, MREL in 




Covered deposits                                  20 
 
Senior unsecured debt                          40 
Subordinated debt (MREL)                  20 
Capital Instruments                              10 
Equity                                                   10 
 
In liquidation, of the (net) proceeds of 70 the deposit guarantee scheme subrogated for 
the covered depositors would receive 20; senior unsecured debt would receive 40; and 
the remaining 10 would be shared by subordinated debt on a pro rata basis, resulting 
in losses of 50% on their claims. Capital instruments and equity would be wiped out. 
With the presence of systemically important counterparties of nominal 20 among the 
senior unsecured debt in resolution, equity and capital instruments will be wiped out; 
of the subordinated debt, 10 may be written down to absorb the remaining losses, and 
a further 10 may be converted to equity at par to recapitalize the institution. The 
remaining senior unsecured creditors (of which 20 are non-bail-inable), as well as the 
covered depositors will remain unscathed. (Only) subordinated debt would sustain 
losses of 50% on their claims. Under the State aid regime, equity and capital 
instrument would be wiped out, and subordinated debt would have to sustain losses of 
50% before aid may be granted. The effect on moral hazard and market discipline 
under the individual system elements will have been aligned. However, the extent of 
taxpayers’ loss exposure remains very different: the amount of the deposit insurance 
payout not covered by contributions or liquidation proceeds in corporate insolvency; 
capped and with a resolution fund buffer in resolution; and un-capped and with no 
buffer under the State aid regime. Incentives to game the system thus still remain. 
Moreover, under current proposals the setting of firm-specific MREL standards 
depends on a myriad of discretionary decisions by competent and resolution 
                                                        
423 As before, asset values take a hit and have to be written down to 70. 
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authorities and may also change over time. This is likely to prevent the risk-adequate 
pricing of bank capital and thus impair the restoration of market discipline.424  
 
Although particular system elements can be essential for system outcomes, changing 
the system elements generally has the least effect on the system. As Meadows writes, 
if you change all the players on a football team, it is still recognizable as a football 
team. By contrast, changing the interconnections between system elements can have a 
significant impact on system outcomes.425 Modifying the interaction between system 
elements seems indeed to be a more effective means for aligning the bailout system’s 
outcomes with the overall system goal. A first step should be the removal of the 
‘precautionary recapitalization’ loophole. In combination with unreliable stress tests, 
its criteria are open to political manipulation and allow for unlimited government 
support of ailing zombie banks, subject only to the soft and limited State aid loss 
sharing rules. The counter-arguments are unpersuasive. A first argument concerns the 
necessity of a statutory basis for extraordinary public interventions in case of future 
financial disruptions of systemic proportions.426 However, such intervention remains 
always possible at national level, and where the crisis is truly systemic it is extremely 
unlikely that the Court of Justice would find the respective Member State in breach of 
EU law.427 The presence of the precautionary recapitalization loophole, on the other 
hand, invites suboptimal bailout decisions contrary to the overall system objective. 
The second argument concerns the lack of binding agreements on a single-point-of-
entry resolution strategy in a cross-border group context. Precautionary 
recapitalization seems to be the only option for ensuring the continuity of integrated 
operations that are necessary for maintaining systemically important functions in 
                                                        
424 Tröger, supra note 327, at 8. 
425 Again MEADOWS, supra note 27, at 16: ‘Change the rules from those of football to those of 
basketball, and you’ve got, as they say, a whole new ball game.’ 
426 Veron, supra note 390, at para 2; Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Costanza Russo, Precautionary 




427 For example, in Kotnik and Dowling the Court of Justice held that the Second Company Law 
Directive (now Directive (EU) 1132/2017) does not stand in the way of  ‘exceptional measures’ taken 
by national authorities intended to prevent a company’s failure in circumstances where there ‘is a 
serious disturbance of the economy of a Member State and with the objective of preventing a systemic 
risk and ensuring the stability of the financial system;’ Case C-526/14 Kotnik and Others 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:570 paras 87–90; Case C-41/15 Dowling and Others ECLI:EU:C:2016:836 at paras 
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different jurisdictions outside the Euro-zone.428 However, the precautionary 
recapitalization of an institution through its home Member State does not guarantee 
that foreign branches and subsidiaries will not be seized and ring-fenced by host 
country authorities. Only the strengthening of the international coordination and 
cooperation framework will be able to provide the necessary safeguards and address 
the issue effectively.   
 
By closing the precautionary recapitalisation loophole, only the public interest 
requirement would remain as a way out of the BRRD/SRM loss allocation cascade. 
Therefore, in a second step the public interest requirement should be removed as a 
prerequisite for resolution. Any credit institution or investment firm that is failing or 
likely to fail without any reasonable private sector alternative would be subject to the 
BRRD/SRM resolution framework. The latter would emerge as the EU Code for the 
resolution and insolvency of credit institutions and investment firms. National 
corporate insolvency law and the State aid regime would still be relevant in 
supporting roles within the BRRD/SRM resolution framework. The State aid regime 
would provide the standard of assessment for fund aid up to the 5% cap and beyond. 
Corporate insolvency law would be relevant for supplementing the incomplete 
regulatory structure of the BRRD/SRM, notably as regards the ranking of creditors 
and a claims procedure, and for dealing with the residual entity following the exercise 
of transfer tools. On these limited issues, the harmonization or unification of financial 
institution specific national insolvency law is justified and perhaps necessary. 
According to Binder, 429 the BRRD/SRM resolution framework was not deemed to be 
the appropriate instrument for dealing with bank insolvencies of all shapes and sizes 
for two main reasons: the less secure and more uncertain position of creditors in 
resolution (administrative procedure with no input; ex post compensation through 
difficult ‘no-worse-off’ considerations) as compared to corporate insolvency law 
(creditor participation; ex ante protection through pari passu and absolute priority); 
and the consideration that liquidation may sometimes be the most efficient solution 
for a failing firm. As for the latter, there seems to be no reason why an institution may 
not be liquidated in resolution where this is the most cost effective way for dealing 
with firm failure. In particular, the resolution authority has the power to take control 
                                                        
428 Hellwig, supra note 35, para 2.1. 
429 Binder, Proportionality, supra note 177, at 14-20. 
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of an institution, either directly or indirectly, to operate it with all the powers of the 
shareholders and the board of directors, and to manage and dispose of its assets.430 
This would seem to allow for a piecemeal liquidation where necessary. The former 
argument carries more weight. However, by closing the public interest loophole, 
uncertainty for creditors would actually be removed: creditors would be faced with a 
unitary system of creditor rights as the new baseline and could more easily price their 
investments accordingly, in particular if supporting national corporate insolvency law 
would be further harmonized. The BRRD/SRM resolution framework, supported by 
national insolvency law and the State aid regime, would have the capacity to also deal 
with ‘hard cases.’ The cap on resolution fund contributions may be exceeded in 
exceptional circumstances and government financial stabilization tools remain 
available as a last resort. The requirements of these measures would force greater 
transparency: authorities would have to explain why circumstances are exceptional to 
a far greater extent than is currently the case. The main issue is the mandatory 8% loss 
contribution requirement, which may pose a risk of contagion and/or hurt retail 
investors. For larger institutions with easy access to capital markets, both issues could 
be addressed through the adequate calibration of MREL. MREL quality requirements 
could ensure that the holders of MREL instruments would not experience undue stress 
from absorbing losses. The setting of MREL levels with a view to loss absorption 
and/or recapitalization capacity could ensure that retail investors are insulated from 
sustaining any losses. Smaller banks may not have the capacity to issue sufficient 
MREL instruments, at least not without changing their business model. However, for 
these institutions the risk of contagion is unlikely to be very high and retail investors 
could be protected through transition periods and effective conduct of business 
regulation. There is no justification for generally insulating the holders of unsecured 
senior debt from bearing any losses; otherwise these losses would just fall on the 
taxpayer.431 If no bank is too small to be systemic and to be bailed out under the State 
aid regime,432 corporate insolvency law is redundant as a self-standing bank 
resolution regime. Closing the public interest loophole would force competent and 
resolution authorities to deal with any failing institutions within the BRRD/SRM 
resolution framework subject to mandatory but reasonably flexible loss allocation 
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principles, keeping the indirect social costs of bailouts in check. This would make it 
more likely that bailouts would actually be ‘pie-increasing.’ Moreover, the suggested 
modifications would significantly reduce the complexity of the current EU bailout 
framework and thereby enhance transparency and legitimacy of future bailout 
decisions.433 
                                                        
433 BRAUN, supra note 158, at 25. 
